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IN MEMORIAM
On June 21, 2010 25-year-old RCMP  Constable 
Chelsey Robinson was killed in an automobile 
accident while looking  for an impaired driver in 
Edmonton, Alberta.
She had received reports that a drunk driver was traveling  in the 
wrong  direction on a highway at 12:35 am. As she attempted to 
locate the car her patrol car collided with a tractor trailer at an 
intersection.
Responding  units located her patrol car in a 
nearby ditch. She was transported to a hospital 
in Edmonton where she succumbed to her 
injuries a short time later.
Constable Robinson had served with the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police for only 
seven months. 
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On July 13, 2010 26-year-old RCMP 
Constable Michael Potvin drowned after his 
boat capsized on the Stewart River in the 
Yukon. He and another constable were 
taking the boat out near the community of 
Mayo when it capsized.
Constable Potvin, who wasn't wearing a life 
jacket, attempted to swim to shore but was 
unable to make it. His body was 
recovered on July 30th. He had served 
with the RCMP for only a year.
According to the Officer Down 
Memorial Page, 58 Canadian officers 
have lost their lives due to drowning.
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA. The 
articles contained herein are provided for 
information purposes only and are not to be 
construed as legal or other professional 
advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to 
this newsletter. If you would like to be added 
to our electronic distribution list e-mail Mike 
Novakowski at mnovakowski@jibc.ca.
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 10-13, 2011
Mark your calendars. 
The British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of 
P u b l i c S a f e t y a n d 
Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia Police 
Academy are hosting  the Police Leadership 2011 
Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia. This 
is Canada’s largest police leadership conference 
and will provide an opportunity for delegates to 
discuss leadership topics presented by world 
renowned speakers.
www.policeleadershipconference.com
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Note-able Quote
“I'm told by police that [vehicle compartments are] 
getting elaborate in almost a James Bond–ish sort of 
way. You turn on the radio, you push a button, you 
slip it into a particular gear, and a particular panel 
either moves or disappears, and you have access to 
a very well concealed compartment where gang 
members can put guns, drugs and cash.” - British 
Columbia Attorney General, the Honourable Mike 
de Jong, speaking  to Bill 16 - B.C.’s Armoured 
Vehicle and After-Market Compartment Control Act, 
May 3, 2010.
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ILLEGALLY INTERCEPTED CELL 
PHONE CALLS ADMISSIBLE
R. v. Stanton, 2010 BCCA 208
 
The accused, and three others, was 
charged on a 12-count indictment 
with various offences. The charges 
included assault causing  bodily 
harm, assault with a weapon, 
unlawful confinement, aggravated assault, robbery 
and conspiracy to commit an unlawful confinement.  
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court there was 
an issue as to whether the interception of the 
accused’s private communications breached his 
rights under s.8  of the Charter.  The judge found 
there was a breach because the authorization did 
not contain a properly drafted cellular phone 
“resort-to” clause.   But, the judge concluded that 
even if the the accused’s s.8 rights had been 
breached, the calls were admissible under s.24(2) of 
the Charter  using  the Collins/Stillman considerations 
(whether the admission of the evidence would affect 
trial fairness, the seriousness of the breach, and the 
effect of admission on the administration of justice).
Since the calls were not conscriptive evidence, their 
admission would not affect trial fairness. The breach 
was serious - the Crown Agent seeking  the 
authorization made a “deliberate”, “unreasonable” 
and “negligent” decision not to 
seek a cellular telephone “resort-
to” clause that would have 
permitted lawful interception of 
the calls.  Further, the police “must 
have become aware” of the 
absence of a resort-to clause 
authorizing  interception and chose 
nonetheless, “unreasonably” and 
“negligently”, to intercept the calls 
anyway. But the police and Crown 
Agent’s conduct fell in the middle 
ground between good and bad 
f a i t h - t he re we re ne i t he r 
agg rava t i ng  no r m i t i ga t i ng 
c i rcumstances a f fect ing  the 
seriousness of the breach. Finally, 
the trial judge ruled that the 
administration of justice would be 
brought into greater disrepute if the calls were 
excluded. None of the calls were “essential to the 
proof of the Crown’s case”, neither the admission 
nor the exclusion of the calls would have any “long 
term effect on the administration of justice”, and 
each charge was “serious”. The intercepted calls 
were admissible and the accused was convicted of 
unlawful confinement, robbery, assault causing 
bodily harm, and conspiracy to commit unlawful 
confinement.
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal  arguing  the trial judge erred in 
failing  to exclude the intercepted calls under s.24(2) 
of the Charter. Had the calls not been admitted, he 
contended that the other evidence remaining  against 
him would not have established his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Since the time of the trial judge’s decision, the 
Supreme Court revised the factors to be considered 
in a s.24(2) analysis. The three branches for analysis 
are now:
a) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing  state 
conduct,
b) the impact of the breach on the Charter-
protected interests of the accused, and
c) society’s interest in the adjudication of the 
case on its merits.
In the accused’s view, the 
t h r e e n e w f a c t o r s a l l 
w e i g h e d a g a i n s t t h e 
admission of the calls and 
that, on balance, society’s 
confidence in the justice 
system would be weakened 
by their admission and they 
therefore should have been 
excluded.
In this case the Court of 
Appeal upheld the admission 
of the evidences even if the 
revised s.24(2) framework for 
admissibility was used.
“State conduct resulting in 
Charter violations varies in 
seriousness. At one end of the 
spectrum, admission of evidence 
through inadvertent or minor 
violations may minimally undermine 
public confidence. At the other 
end of the spectrum, admitting 
evidence obtained through a wilful 
or reckless disregard of Charter 
rights will inevitably have a 
negative effect on public 
confidence.”  
Volume 10 Issue 4 - July/August 2010
PAGE 4
Seriousness of the Charter-infringing State Conduct
“State conduct resulting  in Charter violations varies 
in seriousness,” said Justice Rowles, speaking  for the 
Court of Appeal. “At one end of the spectrum, 
admission of evidence through inadvertent or minor 
violations may minimally undermine public 
confidence.  At the other end of the spectrum, 
admitting  evidence obtained through a wilful or 
reckless disregard of Charter rights will inevitably 
have a negative effect on public confidence. 
Evidence that the conduct was part of a pattern of 
abuse tends to support exclusion.”
Impact of the Breach on the Accused
“The impact of a Charter breach may range from 
fleeting  and technical to the profoundly intrusive,” 
said Justice Rowles. “The more serious the impact on 
an accused’s protected interests, the greater the risk 
that admission of the evidence may signal to the 
public that Charter rights are of little actual avail to 
the citizen.   An unreasonable search contrary to s. 8 
may impact on the protected interests of privacy, and 
more broadly, human dignity.  An unreasonable 
search that intrudes on an area in which the 
individual enjoys a high expectation of privacy, or 
that demeans his or her dignity, is more serious than 
one that does not.”
Society’s Interest in Adjudication of the Case 
“The public interest in truth-finding  remains a 
relevant consideration under the s.24(2) analysis and 
the reliability of the evidence is an important factor,” 
said the Court.  “If a breach undermines the 
reliability of the evidence, it points in the direction 
of exclusion.  Conversely, exclusion of relevant and 
reliable evidence may undermine the truth-seeking 
function of the justice system and render the trial 
unfair from the public perspective, thus bringing  the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The fact that 
the evidence obtained in breach may facilitate the 
discovery of the truth and the adjudication of the 
case on its merits must be weighed against factors 
pointing  to exclusion in order to balance the 
interests of truth with the integrity of the justice 
system.”
 
In concluding  that the evidence in this case was 
admissible, the Court of Appeal stated:. 
The warrantless interception of private 
communications generally represents a highly 
intrusive breach of privacy and the judge in this 
case recognized the breach as being a serious 
one. While the judge found the breach itself to 
be serious, he determined that the conduct of 
the police demonstrated neither good faith nor 
bad faith.  Significantly, the Charter-infringing 
state conduct was not wilful or reckless (the 
serious end of the spectrum) nor was it 
inadvertent or minor (the minor error end of the 
spectrum).  In other words, the state conduct in 
this case fits somewhere in the middle of the 
continuum of seriousness. Furthermore, there 
was no evidence that the conduct was part of a 
pattern of abuse and, based on the evidence of 
the Crown precedent for authorizations in use at 
the time as well as the evidence put forward by 
the defence of other authorization orders that 
had been made, the conduct could not be taken 
to be representative of what the Crown agents 
were doing.  The police could have intercepted 
the communications lawfully if the “resort-to” 
paragraph contained in the Crown Counsel 
precedent relating to cellular phones had been 
included in the authorization.   This is a case in 
which the impugned conduct might be termed 
“one-off” and unlikely to be replicated, 
particularly not by anyone involved in or 
knowledgeable about this investigation or 
prosecution. 
As to society’s interest in an adjudication on the 
merits, the judge decided to admit evidence that 
was both highly reliable and relevant.  There is 
no suggestion that the breach in this case 
undermined the reliability of the evidence in any 
w a y. E x c l u s i o n o f t h e i n t e r c e p t e d 
communications would have deprived the 
Crown of real, reliable evidence that the Crown 
considered important to its case and the societal 
interest in the truth-seeking function of a trial.  
The nature and quality of the evidence points to 
inclusion rather than exclusion in the 
circumstances of this case.  [paras. 63- 64]
 The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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ONTARIO’s PUBLIC WORKS 
PROTECTION ACT
Recently, media reports on the G8 and G20 Summits 
held in Ontario has highlighted Ontario’s Public 
Works Protection Act (PWPA). It was this legislation 
that authorized police to identify, search, and arrest 
persons under prescribed circumstances in relation 
to Ontario’s public works.
What is a ‘Public Work’?
Under s.1 of the PWPA a “public work” is defined as 
follows:
“public work” includes,
(a) any railway, canal, highway, bridge, power 
works including all property used for the 
generation, transformation, transmission, 
distribution or supply of hydraulic or 
electrical power, gas works, water works, 
public utility or other work, owned, operated 
or carried on by the Government of Ontario 
or by any board or commission thereof, or by 
any municipal corporation, public utility 
commission or by private enterprises,
(b) any provincial and any municipal public 
building, and
(c) any other building, place or work designated 
a public work by the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council.
Pursuant to a regulation made on June 2, 2010 and 
coming  into force on June 21, the following  were 
designated as public works for the purposes of the 
PWPA:
s.1(1)  Everything described in clause (a) of the 
definition of “public work” in section 1 of the 
Act that is located in the area described in 
Schedule 1, including, without limitation and for 
greater certainty, every sidewalk in that area.
2. The places described in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 
of Schedule 2.
SCHEDULE 1
AREA REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF SECTION 1
The area in the City  of Toronto lying  within a line 
drawn as follows:
Beginning  at the curb  at the southeast corner of Blue 
Jays Way and Front Street West; then north to the 
centre  of Front Street West;  then east  along  the centre 
of Front Street  West to the east curb of Windsor Street; 
then north along  the east curb  of Windsor Street to the 
centre  of Wellington Street; then east along  the centre 
of Wellington Street to the centre of Bay Street; then 
south along  the centre of Bay Street to a point directly 
opposite  the north wall of Union Station; then west 
along  the exterior of  the north wall of Union Station to 
the centre of York Street; then south along  the centre 
of York Street, continuing  east of the abutments  under 
the railway overpass, and  continuing  south along  the 
centre of York Street to the centre of Bremner 
Boulevard; then west along  the centre of Bremner 
Boulevard to the east  curb of Lower Simcoe Street; 
then south along  the east curb of Lower Simcoe Street 
to the north curb  of Lake Shore Boulevard West; then 
west along  the north curb of Lake Shore Boulevard 
West to the south end  of the walkway that is located 
immediately  west of the John Street Pumping  Station 
and  runs between Lake Shore Boulevard West and  the 
bus parking  lot of the Rogers Centre;  then north along 
the west edge of that walkway to the bus parking  lot 
of the Rogers Centre; then west along  the south edge 
of the bus parking  lot of the Rogers  Centre to the west 
edge of the driveway running  between the parking  lot 
and  Bremner Boulevard; then north along  the west 
edge of that driveway to the north curb  of Bremner 
Boulevard; then west along  the north curb  of Bremner 
Boulevard to the east curb of Navy Wharf Court; then 
north along  the east curb of Navy Wharf  Court to the 
southwest point  of  the building  known as 73  Navy 
Wharf  Court;  then east  along  the exterior of the south 
wall of that building; then north along  the exterior of 
the east wall  of that building  to the curb of Blue Jays 
Way; then north along  the east curb  of Blue Jays Way 
to the curb at  the southeast corner of Blue Jays Way 
and Front Street West.
SCHEDULE 2
DESIGNATED PLACES REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF 
SECTION 1
1. The area, within the area described in Schedule 1, 
that is within five metres of a line drawn as follows:
Beginning  at the south end  of  the walkway that is 
located  immediately west of the John Street Pumping 
Station and runs between Lake Shore Boulevard  West 
and  the bus parking  lot of the Rogers Centre;  then 
north along  the west  edge of that  walkway to the bus 
parking  lot of the Rogers Centre; then west along  the 
south edge of the bus parking  lot of the Rogers Centre 
to the west edge of the driveway running  between the 
parking  lot and Bremner Boulevard; then north along 
the west edge of that  driveway and  ending  at Bremner 
Boulevard.
2. The area, within the area described in Schedule 1, 
that is within five metres of a line drawn as follows:
Beginning  at  the southwest point of the building 
known as 73  Navy Wharf Court; then east along  the 
exterior of the south wall of that building; then north 
along  the exterior of the east wall of  that building  and 
ending at the curb of Blue Jays Way.
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3. The below-grade driveway located between Union 
Station and  Front Street West and running  between 
Bay Street and York Street in the City of Toronto.
The regulation designating  the areas found in 
Schedule I and Schedule 2 was revoked on June 28, 
2010.
Powers of peace officer
Section 3 of the PWPA prescribes the powers 
afforded to peace officers (and guards as appointed) 
to request identification, conduct warrantless 
searches of persons and/or vehicles, to deny entry, 
and use as much force as is necessary to prevent 
entry: 
A guard or peace officer,
(a) may require any person entering or 
attempting  to enter any public work or any 
approach thereto to furnish his or her name 
and address, to identify himself or herself and 
to state the purpose for which he or she 
desires to enter the public work, in writing or 
otherwise;
(b) may search, without warrant, any person 
entering or attempting to enter a public work 
or a vehicle in the charge or under the 
control of any such person or which has 
recently been or is suspected of having been 
in the charge or under the control of any such 
person or in which any such person is a 
passenger; and
(c) may refuse permission to any person to enter 
a public work and use such force as is 
necessary to prevent any such person from so 
entering. 
Offences
Section s.5(1) of the PWPA sets out a number of 
offences, including  neglecting  or refusing  to obey a 
request or direction of peace officer:
Every person who neglects or refuses to comply 
with a request or direction made under this Act 
by a guard or peace officer, and every person 
found upon a public work or any approach 
thereto without lawful authority, the proof 
whereof lies on him or her, is guilty of an 
offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of 
not more than  $500 or to imprisonment for a 
term of not more than two months, or to both.
Arrest
Section 5(2) provides a peace officer with the 
warrantless power to arrest a person for neglecting 
or refusing  to comply with a request or direction by 
a peace officer: 
A guard or peace officer may arrest, without 
warrant, any person who neglects or refuses to 
comply with a request or direction of a guard or 
peace officer, or who is found upon or 
attempting  to enter a public work without lawful 
authority. 
Case Law
The PWPA has been considered in a number of 
Ontario cases, particularly those concerning 
searches at courthouses. 
In R. v. Skeete, [2002] O.J. No. 3048 (Ont.C.J.) the 
accused entered a Hamilton courthouse and the 
shaving  kit bag  he had with him was manually 
searched for weapons. It contained crack cocaine 
and he was arrested and charged with possession for 
the purpose of trafficking, possessing  proceeds of 
crime, and breach of recognizance. The judge ruled 
that s.3 of the PWPA complied with s.8  of the 
Charter and did not need to include a requirement 
of reasonable grounds. “The legislation is self-
explanatory and necessary for the protection of all 
involved who are present in our courts,” said the 
judge:
 
In my opinion there is a lowered expectation of 
privacy when one enters a public building, such 
as a courthouse, especially where notices of 
pending searches are clear and present. A person 
has a right to turn around and leave prior to 
search. There is full autonomy. They may then 
return, knowing full well that they will be 
searched upon return. It is a general search and 
no individual is singled out for special treatment, 
thereby preserving  individual integrity. It is 
performed for security purposes and not criminal 
investigations. There should be very little 
expectation of privacy and, consequently, as a 
result, that limited expectation does not require 
Volume 10 Issue 4 - July/August 2010
PAGE 7
that searches only be conducted where there are 
reasonable and probable grounds. [para. 29]
The judge upheld the constitutionality of the PWPA, 
finding  it was a valid piece of “legislation enacted 
for very important purposes by a duly elected 
legislature.”
In R. v. Campanella (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 342 
(Ont.C.A.), the accused entered the Hamilton 
Courthouse to appear on a drug  charge. While going 
through screening  her purse was manually searched 
and a baggie of marijuana was found. She was 
arrested and charged. The Ontario Court of Justice, 
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, and the 
Ontario Court of Appeal all held that the search and 
seizure did not violate s.8  of Charter. The security 
screening  that took place was authorized by s.3(b) of 
the PWPA. "Public work" was defined in s.1 to 
include "any provincial and any municipal public 
building", which obviously included a courthouse. 
As well, s.137 of the Police Services Act provided 
that the police services board was responsible for 
ensuring the security of the courthouse.
In R. v. S.S. et al, [2005] O.J. No. 5002 (Ont.S.C.J.) 
the accuseds, charged with serious criminal offences 
including  murder, attempted murder, robbery, drug 
trafficking, weapons offences and belonging  to a 
criminal organization, challenged the requirement 
that all individuals entering  the courtroom would be 
searched with a hand wand and manual or visual 
searches of carried receptacles, including  lawyers’ 
briefcases, would be undertaken for weapons or 
escape implements. The Chief of Police, for reasons 
of security and public safety, had concluded that 
prior security clearance should not be extended to 
lawyers (Crown or defence counsel) or court staff. 
The searches were authorized under s.3(b) of the 
PWPA and the judge ruled there was no actual or 
potential violation of anyone’s s.8  Charter rights and 
there was no basis to declare s.3(b) unconstitutional.
In R. v. Skinner-Withers, 2006 ONCJ 47 the accused 
was taken from the police station to the courthouse 
for his bail hearing. He was patted down for 
weapons or contraband, but became agitated. A 
scuffle ensued and he punched an officer in the 
face. He was charged with assaulting  a peace officer 
engaged in the lawful execution of his duties. At trial 
the accused argued the offence had not been made 
out because the search was illegal (there was no 
authority for it) and even if it was authorized, it was 
unreasonable because he had already been searched 
on a number of occasions after being  taken into 
custody the previous day. The court found that not 
only did the PWPA authorize the routine search of 
persons out of custody (as was the case in 
Campanella), it also authorized searches of persons 
already in custody. “[I]ndividuals (accused and non-
accused alike) who enter court buildings out of 
custody may be routinely searched,” said the judge. 
“It cannot be the case that those who attend court 
facilities in custody should not be subjected to 
similar, non-invasive precautionary measures”.
In R. v. Nicolosi,[1993] O.J. No. 3406 (Ont.G.D.) 
Toronto Police officers stopped the accused and 
subsequently impounded the vehicle he was driving. 
The police undertook an inventory search and found 
a handgun. In the Ontario Court of Justice (General 
Division) the Crown attempted to justify the search 
pursuant to s.3(b) of the PWPA (among  other 
authorities). The judge however, rejected this 
argument. Although, s.1 of the PWPA defined a 
"public work" as including  a highway (and "highway" 
is defined as including  any street), the evidence did 
“not establish that any of the steps taken by police 
were for the purpose of protecting  a public work.” 
Therefore, there was no basis to invoke the 
provisions of the PWPA. The search, however, was 
upheld as a lawful inventory search under Ontario’s 
Highway Traffic Act permitting  impoundment of the 
vehicle (see R. v. Nicolosi (1998), 127 C.C.C. (3d) 
176 (Ont.C.A.)).
Note-able Quote
“[I]f you were making $500 or $600 an hour and 
$5,000 or $6,000 a day in court, you wouldn’t be 
complaining about long trials. You’d want them to 
go on forever! ... And for those who think that 
way, the Charter is like a gift from heaven. It is the 
godsend of all godsends.” - Ontario Court of 
Appeal Justice Maldover, remarks to the Justice 
Summit, “The State of the Criminal Justice System in 
2006: an Appellate Judge’s Perspective” - November 
15, 2006, Toronto, Ontario.
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BC COURT FACILITY SECURITY
Courtroom security in British Columbia is the 
responsibility of Sheriffs services. Among  other 
things, Sheriffs also escort prisoners by ground and 
air to and from remand facilities for court 
appearances. 
Searching Persons
Under s.6.1(3) of British Columbia’s Sheriff Act (SA), 
a sheriff may search a person for weapons inside or 
entering a court facility. 
A sheriff may do one or more of the following:
(a) search a person for weapons in the manner 
prescribed by the minister before the person 
enters a court facility or at any time while the 
person is inside the court facility.
Under s.2 of the Sheriff Act Security Regulation 
(SASR), the search conducted under s.6.1(3) of the 
SA may be a pat-frisk search or screening  search. 
These types of searches are defined under s.1(1) of 
the SASR as follows:
“pat-frisk search”  means a hand search or a 
search by use of a hand-held screening device, 
conducted by a sheriff
(a) of a clothed person, from head to foot, down 
the front and rear of the body, around the 
legs, and inside clothing  folds, pockets and 
footwear, and
(b) of any personal possessions, including 
clothing, that the person may be carrying or 
wearing.
“screening  search” means a search by a sheriff 
of a clothed person and any personal 
possessions, including  clothing, the person may 
be carrying or wearing, that is conducted 
visually or with the use of a screening device, 
including  without limitation, a walk-through or 
hand-held metal detector or a fluoroscope.
In order to search a person inside a court facility a 
sheriff may require the person move to another place 
inside the facility (s.6.1(3)(b) SA). Furthermore, a 
sheriff may seize any weapon in the possession of a 
person who is in, or is attempting  to enter, a court 
facility (s.6.1(3)(c) SA). If the person refuses to be 
searched for weapons, refuses to move to another 
place for the purpose of a search, or refuses to 
relinquish a weapon in their possession, a sheriff 
may refuse a person entry to, or evict a person from, 
a court facility (s.6.1(4)(a)-(c) SA). Furthermore, if a 
sheriff has reason to believe that the person is (i) a 
threat to the safety of the court facility or to the 
health or safety of any of its occupants, or (ii)  
disrupting  court proceedings, they may refuse the 
person entry to or evict them from the court facility 
(s.6.1(4)(d) SA). 
Arrest
In addition to the powers of a sheriff to search, seize, 
and evict, a sheriff may arrest a person under s.
6.1(4.1) of the SA.
... a sheriff may arrest a person who is in a court 
facility area or evict a person from a court 
facility area if
(a) the person is in possession of a weapon and 
refuses to comply with the sheriff’s request to 
relinquish the weapon to the sheriff, or
(b) the sheriff has reason to believe that the 
person is
 (i)   a threat to the safety of the court facility 
 or the health or safety of any of the 
 occupants of the court facility, or
 (ii)  disrupting court proceedings.
Use of Force
A sheriff is entitled to use reasonable force in 
refusing  entry, evicting, or seizing  a weapon under s.
6.1(5) of the SA:
A sheriff may use reasonable force in
(a) refusing a person entry to a court facility, a 
restricted zone or a court facility area,
(b) evicting a person from a court facility or a 
restricted zone, or
(c) seizing a weapon from a person who is in, or 
is attempting  to enter, a court facility or a 
court facility area.
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Searching Prisoners
Under s.6.2(2) of the SA, a “sheriff may conduct a 
search of a prisoner and any personal possessions, 
including  clothing, that the prisoner may be carrying 
or wearing.” A prisoner means “a person in lawful 
custody of a sheriff” (s.6.2(1) SA). A strip search is 
defined in s.1(1) of the SASR as:
“strip search”  means a visual inspection by an 
authorized person of a nude person that 
includes
(a)    a visual inspection of the following:
(i) the person undressing completely;
(ii) the open mouth, hands or arms of the 
person;
(iii) the soles of the feet and the insides of the 
ears of the person;
(iv) the person running  his or her fingers 
through his or her hair;
(v) the person bending over, and
(b) the person otherwise enabl ing  the 
authorized person to perform the visual 
inspection.
Strip searches are permitted provided that:
  
s.6.2(4)  Before a sheriff conducts a strip search 
of a prisoner, the sheriff must
(a) believe on reasonable grounds that the 
prisoner may be in possession of contraband,
(b) believe on reasonable grounds that a strip 
search is necessary in the circumstances, and
(c) obtain the authorization of the sheriff's 
supervisor, unless the sheriff believes on 
reasonable grounds that the delay necessary 
to comply with this requirement would result 
in danger to human life or safety.
However, s.6.2(4) “does not apply to a strip search 
of a prisoner conducted by a sheriff on taking 
custody of the prisoner for transport from a 
penitentiary under the control of Canada” (s.6.2(5) 
SA). And “a strip search of a prisoner must be 
conducted by a sheriff of the same sex as the 
prisoner unless the delay that would be caused by 
complying  with this requirement would result in 
danger to human life or safety” (s.6.2(6) SA).
However, “if the circumstances allow, before 
conducting  a strip search, a sheriff must (a)  inform 
the prisoner to be strip searched of the reasons for 
the strip search, and (b) explain how a strip search is 
conducted” (s.2.1(1) SASR). As well, under s.2.1 of 
the SASR additional procedures must be adhered to:
 
s.2.1(2)   A strip search that is conducted by a 
sheriff must be
(a) observed by one other sheriff or other peace 
officer,
(b) carried out in as private an area as the 
circumstances allow, and
(c) carried out as quickly as the circumstances 
allow.
(3)  The person referred to in subsection (3) (a) 
must be the same gender as the prisoner who is 
the subject of a strip search unless the sheriff's 
supervisor believes on reasonable grounds that 
the delay necessary to comply with this 
requirement would result in danger to human 
life or safety.
Contraband
Under s.6.2 of the Sheriff Act “contraband” means
(a) contraband described in paragraphs (a) to (e) of the 
definition of "contraband" in the Correction Act, or
(b) an object or substance that, in the opinion of a 
sheriff's supervisor, may threaten the security or 
safety of sheriffs or persons in the custody of 
sheriffs.
Under paragraphs (a) to (e) of British Columbia’s 
Correction Act, contraband means:
(a) an intoxicant;
(b) if possessed without prior authorization, a weapon, 
any component of a weapon or ammunition for a 
weapon, or anything that is designed to kill, injure or 
disable or is altered so as to be capable of killing, 
injuring or disabling;
(c) an explosive or bomb, or any component of an 
explosive or bomb;
(d) if possessed without prior authorization, any 
currency; 
(e) if possessed without prior authorization, tobacco 
leaves or any products produced from tobacco in 
any form or for any use.
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DID YOU KNOW?
...that according  to a recent Leger Marketing  poll 
released in May 2010, 83% of Canadians surveyed 
agreed that adult sentences should be considered for 
youths found guilty of serious crimes, like murder 
and aggravated assault. Half (50%) agreed 
completely while another 33% agreed somewhat in 
tougher sentences for youth convicts. Residents in 
Alberta (90%), Manitoba/Saskatchewan (89%) and 
the Maritimes (89%) were more likely to agree in 
tougher sentences while residents in Quebec (79%) 
and British Columbia (78%) were less likely to 
agree. In Ontario, 82% agreed in tougher sentences. 
(source http://www.legermarketing.com/documents/SPCLM/105262ENG.pdf)
ROBBERY IN CANADA
In Statist ics Canada’s 
Spr ing  2010 re lease 
“Police-reported robbery 
in Canada, 2008”, the 
following  highlights were 
reported:
• in 2008 there were about 32,000 robberies;
• robberies accounted for 7% of all violent crime;
• robberies in Canada were down -6.7% in 2008 
from 2007;
• over the past 10 years (from 1999 to 2008) 
robberies in Canada were down -9.6%;
• the greatest decreases in robberies over the past 
10 years have occurred in Quebec (-30.1%), 
British Columbia (-22.1%), and Manitoba 
(-21.6%);  
• the greatest increases in robberies over the past 
10 years have occurred in Newfoundland 
( + 1 1 4 . 7 % ) , N u n av u t ( + 9 4 . 9 % ) , a n d 
Saskatchewan (+32.1%);
•
Police-reported robbery in Canada, 1999-2008,
rate per 100,000 population
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What is robbery?
Robbery is defined as an 
incident of theft that also 
involves violence or the 
threat of violence. 
2008 ROBBERY RATES
Area (province or territory) Rate per 
100,000 
residents
Rate change 
from 2007 to 
2008
Manitoba 157.9 -21.6%
Saskatchewan 128.4 -18.1%
British Columbia 123.0 -3.7%
Alberta 105.5 -4.3%
Ontario 92.2 -5.5%
Quebec 90.0 -4.1%
Nova Scotia 61.3 -15.8%
Northwest Territories 53.1 -11.0%
Nunavut 50.9 +22.3%
Yukon 45.3 -7.8%
New Brunswick 28.1 -9.3%
Newfoundland 27.4 -13.9%
Prince Edward Island 16.4 +42.0%
Canada 96.9 -6.7%
90
100
110
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
107.2
99.7 99.2 95.8
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• the only violent crimes that occur more often 
than robbery are assault and uttering threats; 
• while most violence occurs between people 
who know each other, robberies are usually 
committed by a stranger;
• about 25% of robberies also involved an 
additional offence, most commonly a weapon 
offence, assault, or uttering threats;
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• robbery is committed predominately by 
young  males. In 2008, 87% of those 
accused of robbery were male while nearly 
66% were between 12 and 24 years of age;
• the highest rates of robbery were among  15 
to 18 year olds.
There are three major locations where 
robberies occur:
✦ outdoor public locations (such as streets, 
parking  lots, open areas, and transit 
facilities);
✦ commercial or institutional locations 
(such as convenience stores and gas 
stations, banks or financial institutions, 
other commercial places like office 
buildings and grocery stores, schools, 
and other non commercial places like 
community centres, hospitals, and 
churches);
✦ residences (such as private dwelling 
units (home invasions) and other private 
property structures). 
Robbery by Location Type
Location Number % Rate per 
100,000
Outdoor Public 13,634 50.3% 41.7
Street 9,123 33.7% 27.9
Parking Lot 1,669 6.2% 5.1
Open Area 1,646 6.1% 5
Transit Facility 1,196 4.4% 3.7
Commercial or Institution 10,682 39.4% 32.7
Convenience Store & Gas Station 3,518 13% 10.8
Bank or Financial 1,240 4.6% 3.8
Other Commercial Place 5,024 18.5% 15.4
School 560 2.1% 1.7
Other Non-Commercial Place 340 1.3% 1
Residence 2,782 10.3% 8.5
Private dwelling unit 2,679 9.9% 8.2
Other private structure 103 0.4% 0.3
Source: Statistics Canada, Spring 2010, “Police-reported 
robbery in Canada, 2008”, catalogue no. 85-002-X, Vol. 
30, no. 1.
Top Ten 2008 Robbery Rates by Census Metropolitan Area (CMA)
CMA Rate per 100,000 Rate change from 2007 to 2008
Winnipeg, MB 232.7 -23.0%
Regina, SK 221.9 -11.9%
Saskatoon, SK 211.8 -29.4%
Vancouver, BC 170.8 -4.9%
Edmonton, AB 170.5 +0.9%
Montreal, QC 151.2 -2.1%
Toronto, ON 133.4 -6.0%
Thunder Bay, ON 131.3 -7.7%
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 126.7 +3.0%
Halifax, NS 122.2 -11.2%
• the CMAs with the greatest percent 
increases in robberies from 2007 to 
2008  were Trois-Rivieres QC 
(+63.7%), Gatineau QC (31.4%), 
Saint John NB (+30.7%), Windsor 
ON (+30.4%), and Kelowna BC 
(+14.3%);
• the CMAs with the greatest percent 
decreases in robberies from 2007 
to 2008  were Saguenay QC 
(-42.7%), Brantford ON (-35.1%), 
Saskatoon SK (-29.4%), Moncton 
NB (-27.4%), and Kitchener ON 
(-24.6%);
• over the past 10 years from 1999 to 
2008, Thunder Bay ON reported 
the greatest increase in robberies at 
+122.9%. 
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SPITTING ON COP WARRANTS 
CUSTODIAL SENTENCE
R. v. Charlette, 2010 SKCA 78
The accused’s mother called police 
to report that her daughter, the 
accused, had been abusive, was 
causing  a disturbance, and needed to 
be removed from the home. While 
being  placed in police cells, the accused spit in an 
officer’s face twice, and spit upon his clothing 
once.  And she continued spitting  as the officers 
attempted to lock the cell door. Earlier, the accused 
told police she had a “contagious disease,” but 
when asked whether she really had such a disease, 
she laughed and said “maybe he should go get 
checked out.” The police officer who was spit upon 
undertook a series of treatments and tests. At a later 
time, after initially refusing  to provide access to her 
medical records, the accused did grant access which 
ultimately revealed she was not suffering  from any 
disease.  The accused was released on bail, but on 
successive occasions refused to comply with the 
curfew and alcohol terms of her release.  
The accused plead guilty to assault and six counts of 
breaching  her interim release conditions. At her 
sentencing  hearing  the officer provided a victim 
impact statement that indicated he, and his family, 
were deeply troubled by the possibility he had 
contracted a communicable disease.  The ongoing 
tests and treatment he was required to undergo were 
difficult and bothersome.  At the time he had an 
unhealed wound on his face, which added to his 
distress. The accused had a minor youth record, a 
severe addiction problem, 
and social issues.  Her pre-
sentence report indicated 
that she did not accept that 
she had done anything 
wrong  and dur ing  the 
sentencing  hearing  she 
acted out, demonstrating 
little concern for the harm 
she had caused.  
In Saskatchewan Provincial 
Court the sentencing  judge 
emphasized the accused’s need for rehabilitation 
and gave her time served (nine days on remand) plus 
six months’ probation for the assault and six 
breaches.  The terms of probation did not require a 
curfew, nor have an alcohol abstinence or treatment 
clause. She was required to report in person to her 
probation officer, reside at an approved residence, 
take personal counselling, and write a letter of 
apology within 60 days of sentencing.  
 
The Crown appealed the sentence to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, submitting  that the 
judge over-emphasized the sentencing  principle of 
rehabilitation and did not recognize the gravity of 
the offence.  As well, the sentence would not deter 
the accused, or others, from committing  a far too 
common type of assault against police officers - 
spitting. The Crown contended that a sentence of 30 
to 90 days, plus an 18-month probation order, 
would be appropriate.  
 
Justice Jackson, delivering  the opinion of the Court 
of Appeal, agreed. “Spitting  on someone is a 
particularly distasteful and harmful form of assault,” 
she said. “It is almost always accompanied by the 
veiled or express threat of transmitting  a 
communicable disease. The possibility of contracting 
a disease is real, and the fear of developing  a disease 
preys on the victim’s mind for some time to 
come.  Police officers, whose jobs require them to 
confront individuals in close quarters, have few 
resources to counter an assault of spitting.”  
 
The Court ruled that a custodial sentence was in 
order. The sentence of probation imposed by the 
Provincial Court, with its terms, constituted no 
sentence at all, the Court of Appeal found. In 
its place, a fit sentence of 60 days custody, 
along  with a six month probationary period 
with a clause requiring  her to abstain from 
alcohol and drugs, was imposed.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“Spitting on someone is a 
particularly distasteful 
and harmful form of 
assault. ...  Police officers, 
whose jobs require them 
to confront individuals in 
close quarters, have few 
resources to counter an 
assault of spitting.”  
www.10-8.ca
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BREATHALYZER READINGS CAN 
BE CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING 
CREDIBILITY
R. v. Kernighan, 2010 ONCA 465
The accused was convicted of driving 
over 80mg%, contrary to s.253(b) of 
the Criminal Code. At trial, the Crown 
relied on the testimony of the blood 
technician to establish that the two 
breathalyzer readings of 140mg% and 130mg% 
were both taken within two hours of the alleged 
offence. The accused raised the “Carter defence”, 
arguing  that the readings did not reflect his blood 
alcohol content at 9:38 p.m., the time at which he 
was caught driving. He said he consumed only five 
beers and, based on his account of events, an expert 
toxicologist said the accused’s blood alcohol 
concentration would have been between 0% and 
41mg% when he was pulled over by the police.   A 
judge of the Ontario Court of Justice, after 
considering  the defence evidence in light of the 
breathalyzer readings and the evidence as a whole, 
concluded the accused’s “evidence to the contrary” 
was not reasonably capable of belief. 
An appeal by the accused to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice was unsuccessful. The appeal judge 
found no error in taking  the breathalyzer readings 
into consideration when assessing  the evidence to 
the contrary and the accused’s credibility.  
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal. He submitted that the trial judge erred in 
using  the breathalyzer readings when assessing  his 
credibility and the evidence to the contrary.  In his 
view, there are no circumstances where breathalyzer 
readings can be used to assess the credibility of any 
evidence to the contrary.  The Crown, on the other 
hand, contended that there is only a prohibition 
against using  breathalyzer readings in assessing 
credibility when the presumption of accuracy is 
challenged. However, here the Crown was not 
relying  on the presumption of accuracy but on the 
oral evidence of the breath technician to establish 
the accuracy of the readings. In the Crown’s view, 
the accused was challenging  the presumption of 
identity and the trial judge was entitled to consider 
the accused’s breathalyzer readings.  
Justice Gillese, delivering  the unanimous judgment 
for the Court of Appeal, agreed with the Crown. 
“The presumption of accuracy relates to the 
accused’s blood alcohol concentration at the time 
the breath sample was taken,” he said.  “Challenging 
this presumption requires adducing  some evidence 
that the certificate does not in fact correctly reflect 
the accused’s blood alcohol level at the time of the 
breathalyzer test.” He continued:
The presumption of identity, on the other hand, 
relates to the accused’s blood alcohol 
concentration at the time of the offence.  
Challenging  the presumption of identity requires 
adducing some evidence to suggest that the 
accused’s blood alcohol concentration at the 
time of the offence was not the same as it was at 
the time that the breath samples were taken.
The presumption of accuracy allows the Crown 
to file the certificate of the breath technician as 
proof of the [accused’s] breath sample readings 
without having  to call the breath technician as a 
witness in the trial (s. 258(1)(g)).  In the present 
case, the Crown chose to call the breath 
technician as a witness and, therefore, did not 
THE ‘CARTER DEFENCE’
What is the Carter defence? It is also known as the 
two drink defence. In the National Survey of Crown 
Prosecutors and Defence Counsel on Impaired 
Driving (June 2009), the Carter or two drink defence 
is described as follows:
With the “2-drink” defence, the accused suggests 
that the evidential breath test result must be 
incorrect because it is incompatible with other 
evidence (e.g., testimony of the accused or 
witnesses, receipts to demonstrate the amount of 
alcohol consumed, etc.). The defence will also 
often present testimony from an expert witness 
(e.g., a toxicologist) that, based on evidence of 
the amount of alcohol the accused reported he/
she consumed, the accused’s BAC would have 
been less than that recorded by the evidential 
test. [at p. 43]
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rely on the presumption of accuracy.  It relied 
only on the presumption of identity, contained in 
ss. 258(1)(c) and (d.1), to establish the blood 
alcohol content at the time of driving. 
[T]he prohibition against using  breathalyzer 
readings to assess the accused’s evidence to the 
contrary applies only to situations in which the 
Crown is relying  on the presumption of accuracy 
and the accused is challenging that presumption.  
[references omitted, paras. 14-16]
Since the Crown was relying  on the presumption of 
identity and not the presumption of accuracy, the 
trial judge was entitled to consider the breathalyzer 
readings in assessing  the accused’s evidence to the 
contrary.  “Where defence counsel challenges the 
presumption of identity but not the presumption of 
accuracy, a consideration of the breathalyzer 
readings does not raise the spectre of circular 
reasoning,” said the Court.  Such circular reasoning 
arises when the breathalyzer readings are used to 
prove their own accuracy. But here, where the 
presumption of identity challenges the breathalyzer 
readings, they are part of the body of evidence that 
can be considered in determining  whether the 
defence evidence is capable of raising  a reasonable 
doubt. The accused’s appeal was dismissed
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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DNA ABANDONED: 
NO s.8 BREACH
R. v. Usereau, 2010 QCCA 894
A man was shot dead outside his 
home while another person who 
was shot survived. During  the 
melee, the hood of the assailant’s 
winter jacket came off and a 
handgun was found in the area. A DNA profile was 
identified from the hood and three DNA profiles 
were found on the gun. The accused subsequently 
became a suspect and was placed under police 
surveillance. The police wanted to recover an 
object on which his DNA would be found. Without 
his knowledge, but with the permission of a 
restaurant employee, the police obtained a glass 
and straw the accused had used while dining. The 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Sentencing-Cocaine Trafficking
“[C]ocaine has consistently been 
recognized by this Court as a deadly 
and devastating drug that ravages 
lives. Involvement in the cocaine 
trade, at any level, attracts substantial penalties. It is 
significant that the CDSA classifies cocaine as one of 
the drugs for which trafficking can attract a life 
sentence.” – Nova Scotia Court of Appeal Justice 
Bateman in R. v. Butt, 2010 NSCA 56 at para. 13, setting aside a 
3.5 year sentence for a guilty plea to possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking and substituting a sentence of five years incarceration.. 
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items were submitted for DNA analysis. There 
was a match between the DNA found on the 
glass and the profile found on the hood. A 
DNA warrant was then obtained and executed 
on the accused. Again there was a match. The 
accused was arrested and charged with 
murder and attempted murder. 
At trial in Quebec Superior Court the accused 
argued that the warrantless seizure of the glass 
and straw breached his Charter rights and the 
evidence should have been excluded, along 
with the subsequent DNA matches. For without 
the DNA evidence generated from the glass, it 
was submitted that there would not have been 
reasonable grounds to support the application for 
the DNA warrant. The Crown, on the other hand, 
submitted there was no seizure; it was a mere 
collection of objects because the accused did 
not have a privacy expectation in the DNA he 
abandoned. The trial judge agreed with the 
Crown that there was no Charter violation 
and, even if there was, the evidence was 
nonetheless admissible under s.24(2). 
The accused then challenged the trial judge’s 
ruling  to the Quebec Court of Appeal 
contending  that, although the glass and straw 
had been abandoned, he still retained a 
permanent expectation of privacy in his DNA 
information. He suggested that, under the DNA 
provisions of the Criminal Code, the police 
required his consent or at least reasonable 
grounds to decode his DNA. Without such consent 
or grounds, the police upset the balance between 
crime control and individual privacy interests, 
thereby violating  his right not to incriminate 
himself. As well, he raised the concern that 
the police could retain his DNA information 
in a secret DNA data bank for future use, an 
idea at odds with the government’s destruction 
requirements of DNA information under the 
Criminal Code.
A majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal 
rejected the accused’s arguments. In assessing 
whether a person abandons an item such that 
they cease to have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in it, a court must determine whether 
the person asserting  s.8 Charter protection has 
acted in such a manner that a reasonable and 
independent observer would conclude their 
assertion was unreasonable. Here, “there can be 
little doubt that a reasonable and independent 
observer would conclude that [the accused’s] 
continued assertion of a privacy interest in a glass 
and a straw after he had left the restaurant is 
u n r e a s o n a b l e i n t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e 
circumstances,” said Justice Hilton. He 
continued:
[The accused], however, goes further and 
c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i o n 
of DNA evidence in this manner can give rise 
to legislatively unauthorized covert banks 
of DNA evidence over which no control can 
ever be exercised. This apocalyptic view is 
highly speculative at best. There is no 
evidence that any such covert banks exist or 
have ever existed. Nor is there a risk 
that DNA profiles obtained without a warrant 
under the regime provided for in the Criminal 
Code will be permanently maintained as if they 
had been obtained with a warrant and their 
destruction not subsequently ordered.
This Court has already interpreted restrictively 
w h a t p e r m a n e n t u s e c a n b e m a d e 
of  DNA  samples obtained during a police 
investigation pursuant to a warrant under 
section 487.051 [Criminal Code], as opposed 
to samples taken pursuant to an accused 
having  pleaded guilty to a designated offence 
mentioned in section  487.04 [Criminal 
Code]. The time to consider the legality of 
samples maintained in a covert bank will 
arise if and when it is established that such a 
bank exists, and an accused applies to 
exclude evidence derived from the use of his 
or her DNA  samples in such a bank. [paras. 
48-49]
This ground of appeal was dismissed, but a new 
trial was ordered on other errors by the trial judge. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
www.10-8.ca
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ARREST BASED ON MORE THAN 
MERE HUNCH
R. v. Larocque, 2010 QCCA 1171
The police obtained a search warrant 
for an apartment that had been 
monitored as a suspected outlet for 
drug  dealers. That day, the accused 
attended as a passenger in a vehicle 
with another man who was known as being  active in 
drug  trafficking  and the main target of the 
investigation. Officers in place to execute the 
warrant intercepted visitors and potential buyers to 
obtain additional evidence. Upon leaving  the 
premises a few minutes later, the men returned to 
their vehicle and left, only to be stopped by a patrol 
officer. The accused was arrested for drug 
possession, told of his right to counsel, and 
searched. The search of the vehicle was 
unsuccessful, but four bags of marijuana and one 
bag  containing  28 tablets of methamphetamine were 
found on the accused. He was again placed under 
arrest, this time for possession for the purpose of 
trafficking. He was taken to the police station where 
two additional bags of tablets are found. He 
subsequently acknowledged that he had been 
involved for about three months in the sale of 
narcotics. 
At trial in Quebec District Court the accused 
submitted that the arrest was unlawful for lack of 
reasonable grounds and the subsequent search was 
also unreasonable. Thus the substances should have 
been excluded as evidence. The trial judge, in 
reviewing  s.495 of the Criminal Code, noted that 
the mere presence of the accused in the car of the 
known drug  dealer could not provide reasonable 
grounds. However, the information the officer had in 
preparation for the warrant could contribute to 
establish such grounds, even in the absence of direct 
knowledge. Similarly, events that the officer 
personal ly wi tnessed while watching  the 
surrounding  area prior to the search established the 
reasonableness of his grounds for arrest. Seeing  a 
person leave the scene of an apartment used for the 
likely sale of drugs, along  with seeing  a man known 
to police for his involvement in trafficking  enter the 
residence and then emerge a few minutes later, 
could provide a reasonable belief that he was now 
in possession of narcotics. It was not required that 
the officer be persuaded by the standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused was 
convicted on three counts of possession and 
trafficking  of narcotics. Furthermore, the detention 
could also be analyzed as one for investigative 
purposes. The reasons for justifying  the warrantless 
arrest could also be reasonable grounds for 
suspecting  the accused’s involvement in drugs. 
Nevertheless, even if the accused’s Charter rights 
were breached, the trial judge ruled the evidence 
admissible under s.24(2). 
The accused argued before the Quebec Court of 
Appeal that his motion to exclude evidence should 
have been allowed and that an acquittal should have 
followed. In his view, the police lacked reasonable 
grounds to make the arrest and therefore the search 
was also unreasonable as an incident to it. As well, 
the accused submitted that the police should have 
obtained a warrant in advance, but did not have 
reasonable grounds to do so (just as they lacked the 
grounds for arrest).  
Arrest
Under s.495(1) of the Criminal Code the officer 
could lawfully arrest the accused without a warrant 
if he had a reasonable belief in the commission of a 
crime. This requires not only a subjective belief in 
reasonable grounds, but the belief must also be 
objectively justifiable. 
Subjectively, the officer had been briefed on the 
information obtained in recent weeks by colleagues 
responsible for monitoring  the apartment targeted by 
the search warrant, and he had also been assigned to 
watch the apartment during  the hours preceding  the 
arrest so he could see firsthand the extent of back-
and-forth transactions that took place. Seeing  the 
accused enter the apartment and leave a few 
minutes later, plus the information that the 
investigator had been informed about during  the 
briefing  before the raid, provided reasonable 
grounds for believing  that the accused could be in 
possession of drugs when leaving the residence. 
Objectively, under the circumstances, any other 
officer who received the same information that the 
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arresting  officer had would have been inclined to 
conclude from the actions of two individuals that 
they had probably bought drugs from the occupants 
of the apartment under surveillance. It was not just a 
mere hunch, but a subjective belief based on 
grounds that were objectively justified. 
Search
Under the common law the police may conduct a 
search of arrested persons as an incident to arrest. 
However, this is not an absolute power. The arrest 
must be lawful, the search must have been made 
"incidental" to the lawful arrest, and the search must 
be conducted reasonably. Here, the arrest was 
lawful for drug  possession and the search was for 
purposes consistent with providing  evidence to 
substantiate drug  offences. The search was also 
carried out reasonably. 
Since there was no Charter violations there was no 
need to consider s.24(2).
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AFTER 
ARREST CANNOT BE USED TO 
JUSTIFY IT
R. v. Boudreau-Fontaine, 2010 QCCA 1108
A citizen called 911 fearing  that a 
suspicious person parked near his 
home in a red Mitsubishi was in 
possession of a laptop and was 
connected to a wireless network to 
steal data. Patrol officers approached the scene and 
saw a red Mitsubishi car. It was parked bumper to 
bumper with the car behind it. The accused was in 
the car and had a computer. One of the officers said 
he saw a blue screen divided into two sections that 
looked like the windows of MSN, a chat service. As 
police approached the car the accused closed the 
applications of his computer. He was sweating  and 
seemed nervous. He said he was leaving  a friend’s 
house and stopped to look at his computer files 
relating  to investments. He had a digital camera with 
him, stating  he had it to take pictures of cars on the 
street. He provided his driver’s licence. A computer 
check revealed that he was on probation following  a 
conviction for production and distribution of child 
pornography and one of the conditions prohibited 
him from accessing  the Internet and possessing  a 
firearm. In another case, he was restricted from 
accessing  the Internet and being  in the presence of 
minors unless accompanied by adults. He was 
arrested for breaching  his probation, handcuffed, 
searched, read his rights, and placed in the back of a 
patrol car. His computer was seized and his vehicle 
searched. Several items were found, including 
binoculars, knives, latex gloves, a mobile phone, a 
keyboard, a digital camera, and a GPS. A search 
warrant was obtained for examining  the computer to 
show that it was connected to the Internet, thereby 
violating the conditions of his probation.
At trial in Quebec Court the judge ruled that the 
accused’s rights under s.8  of the Charter had been 
breached and the evidence was excluded. The judge 
rejected the officer’s testimony that he saw the 
accused visit MSN. The arrest and search were 
unlawful and the accused was acquitted of 
possessing  child pornography and of failing  to 
comply with a probation order that prohibited him 
from accessing the Internet. 
The Crown then appealed to the Quebec Court of 
Appeal submitting, among  other grounds, that the 
trial judge erred in finding  that the police had no 
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused and, 
therefore, the evidence was not obtained in breach 
of s.8. As well, even if there was a Charter  violation, 
the Crown suggested that the evidence should have 
been admitted. 
Since the Crown never argued the law applicable to 
investigative detention, the Court of Appeal only 
analyzed the law regarding  arrest under s.495 of the 
Criminal Code. The vehicle search was warrantless; 
therefore the Crown was required to demonstrate, on 
a preponderance of evidence, that it was not 
unreasonable. For a search be reasonable, it must be 
authorized by law, the law must be reasonable, and 
the search must be conducted in a reasonable 
manner. If the power to search stems from the 
exercise of common law to search as an incident to 
arrest, the arrest must be lawful, the search must be 
incidental to the arrest, and the search must be 
executed reasonably. For an arrest to be lawful, the 
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peace officer must believe on reasonable grounds 
that a crime has been committed and the reasons 
must be objectively justified.
In this case, the Crown failed to establish on a 
preponderance of evidence that the officers had 
sufficient information to justify the accused’s arrest 
for violating  probation in connection with accessing 
the Internet. In so deciding, it was important that the 
reasons provided by the police be examined without 
taking  into account the later discovery of the 
contents of the computer, as this information was not 
available when the arrest was made. At the time of 
the arrest the police had no reason to believe that 
the accused was connected to the Internet. 
Consequently, the trial judge’s finding  that the police 
had no reasonable grounds to arrest the accused was 
not unreasonable. Although the police cannot be 
blamed for wanting  to improve their grounds before 
making  an arrest, they can not use the later 
discovery of evidence to conclude that there were 
reasonable grounds at the time they made the arrest.
Nor could the results of the computer analysis be 
used to assess the police officer’s credibility and the 
reliability of his testimony in showing  that he had 
reasonable grounds. Whether it is used to show 
reasonable grounds or confirm an officer’s testimony, 
the ban on taking  into account evidence 
subsequently discovered applied. In either case, the 
reasons given by the police become reasonable 
simply because they are proven correct. The proper 
approach is to assess the grounds at the time of the 
police action. The evidence discovered later may 
show, for example, that the intuition of the officer 
was justified or that it was true, either because he 
was right, or because, as in this case, he was lucky. 
Constitutional rights cannot be based on chance or 
on another form of uncertainty.  The Court of Appeal 
concluded that the accused’s arrest was illegal and 
that the search of the vehicle as well as the ensuing 
seizure were unreasonable and violated s.8. The 
evidence was excluded. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO ARREST 
DOES NOT REQUIRE EXIGENCIES
R. v. Nolet et al, 2010 SCC 24
 
The accuseds were travelling  in 
Saskatchewan along  the Trans-
Canada Highway in with an empty 
5 3 - f o o t Q u e b e c - l i c e n s e d 
commercial tractor-trailer unit. They 
were s topped in a random check under 
Saskatchewan's Highway and Transportation Act 
(H&TA).  Vatsis was driving, Nolet was in the 
passenger seat, and another man, now deceased, 
was in the sleeping  compartment. It was determined 
that the truck’s registration was not pro-rated to 
include the province, the appropriate fuel sticker 
had expired, and the log-book was incomplete and 
indicated that the truck normally operated east of the 
Manitoba border. On request, the accused agreed to 
let the officer inspect the empty trailer. The officer 
thought the trailer “looked odd” but, being  alone, 
decided not to enter the trailer. He decided to 
pursue the defective trucking  document issues by 
inspecting  the interior of the tractor and to look for 
more documents, such as previous bills of lading, 
tickets, and other log  books. In the sleeping 
compartment he found a small duffle bag. When he 
touched the bag, its contents crackled like paper, so 
he opened it, assuming  it contained old log-books or 
travel documents.  However the bag  contained 
$115,000 bundled in small denominations, mainly 
$20 bills.   His experience suggested the packaging 
of cash was typical of drug  transactions and the men 
were arrested for possessing the proceeds of crime. 
After back-up arrived the trailer was again inspected. 
The interior measurements were about three feet 
shorter than the exterior length, indicating  the 
presence of a hidden compartment. The rig  was 
driven about 10 km to the nearest police station 
when, about an hour and a half later, the officers 
opened up the hidden compartment and discovered 
392 pounds of packaged marijuana valued at 
between $1.1 and $1.5 million. The next day, an 
officer from the Integrated Proceeds of Crime Unit 
searched the tractor-trailer rig  for the purpose of 
creating  an inventory of the contents pursuant to 
policy. More documentation was discovered that www.10-8.ca
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was relevant to the H&TA offences, including  factory 
decals, registration papers and permits for different 
companies that, when applied to the exterior, would 
make the truck look completely different. 
At trial in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench 
the judge concluded that police inspection powers 
under the legislation governing  commercial vehicles 
on the highway did not extend to permit a 
warrantless search of the small duffle bag  located in 
the sleeping  compartment of the tractor unit in these 
circumstances; where the officer had no reasonable 
grounds to believe that criminal offences had been 
committed.  While the expectation of privacy in a 
commercial vehicle is generally less than in a private 
vehicle, which is generally less than in a private 
home or office, this lesser privacy interest was still 
entitled to Charter protection. The judge found the 
warrantless searches were unreasonable and the 
evidence of the money and the marijuana was 
excluded. The accuseds were acquitted.
 
On appeal by Crown to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal, a majority found that a mere hunch or 
speculation that a trailer had been altered or re-
fabricated, even if hidden contraband was the 
suspected reason for the 
alteration, did not taint an 
otherwise lawful regulatory 
search.  The accuseds had not 
established that the police were 
using  the highway regulatory 
inspection as a pretext for their 
actions. The detention was not 
arbitrary and the search for 
documents was lawful.  There 
was no s.8 Charter breach and 
the money should not have 
been excluded. The arrest was 
lawful and the marijuana was 
located during  a proper search 
inc identa l to a r res t .  The 
marijuana and cash was admissible and a new trial 
was ordered.
 
The dissenting  justice ruled that the police could not 
rely on a regulatory search power once their “focus” 
became criminal activity. The search authority 
extended to regulatory matters only and police 
could not search for contraband as one of the 
defined purposes of the search. In her view, the cash 
was inadmissible under s.24(2), but the marijuana 
should have been admitted.  Thus, she would have 
upheld the accused’s acquittal on the proceeds of 
crime charge, but order a new trial in relation to the 
drug charges.
 
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. He argued that his detention was arbitrary 
under s.9 of the Charter and the searches that 
followed were unreasonable under s.8.  
Phase I: the Initial Stop
 
Random roadside stops for highway purposes must 
be limited to their intended objectve and cannot be 
turned into an unfounded general inquisition or an 
unreasonable search. It does not provide a general 
search power for searching  every vehicle, driver, and 
passenger that is pulled over. However, “a roadside 
stop is not a static event,” said Justice Binnie, 
speaking  for the entire Supreme Court. “Information 
as it emerges may entitle the police to proceed 
further, or, as the case may be, end their enquiries 
and allow the vehicle to resume its journey.” 
 
Here, the initial stop was valid. The accuseds’ 
truck was stopped to conduct an H&TA 
document check. This was not a case where 
the accused had been pulled over for no valid 
purpose, nor was the random check stop 
specifically set up to also locate contraband 
as well as highway infractions. Instead, the 
random stop program was directly related to 
legitimate highway purposes; commercial 
trucking  was regulated by legislation in every 
aspect. Thus, the initial stop under s.40 of 
Saskatchewan’s Highway Traffic Act did not 
breach s.9.
Phase II: the Regulatory Search
 
Under s.32(1) of Saskatchewan’s  Motor Carrier Act a 
peace officer is authorized to “order the driver or 
owner of a vehicle to submit the vehicle . . . or the 
cargo being  carried on such a vehicle to any 
examination and tests that the peace officer 
considers necessary”.   Similarly, s.63(5) of the H&TA 
“A roadside stop is 
not a static event. 
Information as it 
emerges may entitle 
the police to proceed 
further, or, as the 
case may be, end their 
enquiries and allow 
the vehicle to resume 
its journey.”  
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provides authority to conduct a warrantless search of 
a vehicle for evidence of a regulatory contravention 
under the H&TA. Here, “after the initial stop, the 
officer quickly obtained reasonable grounds to 
believe that the [accuseds] were operating  the truck 
in violation of the H&TA, having  regard to the lack 
of a truck licence valid in Saskatchewan, the display 
of an expired fuel sticker and inconsistent entries in 
the driver’s log-book,” said Justice Binnie.  “At the 
time the officer began to investigate the cab of the 
tractor unit, it was quite within his statutory authority 
to search for further evidence related to H&TA 
offences.” Thus, the continued detention was not 
arbitrary and the search of the tractor-trailer unit for 
relevant papers was authorized by the H&TA. 
 
As for the search in the sleeping  area of the cab, 
including  the space behind the front seats, there was 
a reasonable expectation of privacy. Living  quarters, 
however rudimentary, are not a Charter-free zone. 
But the level of expectation is low, even in the 
sleeping  area, since the cab of a tractor-trailer rig  is 
also a place of work. The entire cab is therefore 
vulnerable to frequent random checks in relation to 
highway transport matters.  
The continued lawful detention and search under s.
63(5) did not become unlawful because the officer 
began to suspect criminal activity.  Police officers 
patrolling  highways are interested in many offences, 
including  criminal ones as well as provincial 
matters. However, “police power, whether conferred 
by statute or at common law, is abused when it is 
exercised in a manner that violates the Charter rights 
of an accused,” said Justice Binnie. He continued:
I do not agree that the officer’s concurrent 
interest in contraband (even if it 
was “predominant”) rendered the 
H & TA s e a r ch u n l aw f u l o r 
unreasonable within the scope of 
s. 8  of the Charter.  As already 
stated, knowledge of transportation 
legislation is a requirement to be 
licensed as a driver.  Commercial 
drivers are well aware of the 
police authority to conduct 
random stops and to search a 
v e h i c l e f o r e v i d e n c e o f 
infractions. Commercial trucking is 
a highly regulated industry. Breaching a law will 
not in itself reduce an individual’s legitimate 
privacy expectations (otherwise, it would be 
argued that offenders would always forfeit s. 8 
protection relevant to evidence of the offence), 
but here, as events progressed from the police 
stop to the initial regulatory search of the cab, 
there was no police invasion of the minimal 
pr ivacy interest that exis ted.  …“[T]he 
expectation that the search might also uncover 
drugs” … did not convert a Charter-compliant 
regulatory search into a Charter violation. 
[references omitted, para. 43]
The paper-like contents of the bag  felt more like 
items connected to the H&TA inquiry than personal 
clothing  or drugs.  The warrantless search was 
authorized by s.63(5) of the H&TA and it was not 
unreasonable for the officer to open the bag.  Given 
the very limited privacy interest, the search of the 
duffle bag  did not breach s.8. The cash was then in 
plain view.
 
Phase III: the Arrest 
Although the discovery of a large sum of cash may 
not on its own constitute objective, reasonable 
grounds to arrest for possession of proceeds of 
crime, its existence may contribute to such grounds 
if the circumstances create a reasonable inference 
that the money was proceeds of crime:  
Here, the context was sufficient to supply the 
officer with the “something more”:  three men in 
an empty, improperly licensed truck making  a 
run across the prairies at midnight on a highway 
where the truck was not entitled to be.  The 
explanation for where the cargo had gone, and 
why the truck was apparently empty as it headed 
east, did not correspond to the 
documents, which were riddled 
with multiple discrepancies.   The 
unexplained $115,000 was in bills 
of small denominations wrapped 
in bundles which the police officer 
believed to be typical of drug 
dealings… While the Crown did 
not attempt to qualify the officer as 
an expert on drug monies, the 
officer’s experience and training 
supported the probative value of 
his evidence on this point.  The 
“Looked at individually no 
single [factual element] is 
likely sufficient to warrant 
the grounds for the 
detention and seizure. The 
whole is greater than the 
sum of the individual parts 
viewed individually.”  
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cumulative effect of the factual elements 
previously described provides objective support 
for the officer’s subjective belief that he had 
reasonable and probable grounds to make the 
arrests. … “Looked at individually no single one 
is likely sufficient to warrant the grounds for the 
detention and seizure. The whole is greater than 
the sum of the individual parts viewed 
individually.” [references omitted, para. 48]
 
Phase IV: Search After Arrest
 
The police may search as an incident to arrest if they 
are trying  to achieve some valid purpose connected 
to the arrest, such as:
ensuring the safety of the police and public; 
protecting  evidence from destruction at the 
hands of the arrestee or others; or
discovering  evidence which can be used at 
the arrestee’s trial.” 
Here, the accuseds were arrested for possessing 
proceeds of crime. “It was clearly ‘incidental’ to this 
arrest to search the vehicle in which the cash was 
found for evidence of the criminal activity to which 
the money related,” said Justice Binnie. “The 
officers’ belief that this purpose would be served by 
a search of the trailer (given their previous roadside 
observation of the discrepancy in the dimensions) 
was itself reasonable.  The important consideration is 
the link between the location and purpose of the 
search and the grounds for the arrest.” The two hour 
delay between the roadside arrest and the search of 
the trailer’s secret compartment at the police station 
did not render this search unreasonable. There 
remained a close causal and spatial connection 
between the arrest and the search.  
As well, there was no requirement for the police to 
demonstrate a distinct and separate showing  of 
reasonable grounds to search. Nor was a showing  of 
exigent circumstances required to further search the 
trailer without first obtaining  a search warrant. The 
trigger for the warrantless search power incidental to 
arrest is not “exigent circumstances” but connection 
or relatedness -  to search for evidence of the crime 
to which the arrest related. The search and seizure of 
the marijuana did not breach s.8  of the Charter; it 
was discovered during  a proper search for evidence 
incidental to a valid arrest.
 
Phase V: the Inventory Search
The Supreme Court ruled that the inventory search 
was invalid. The inventory search by itself did not 
serve a valid objective in pursuit of the ends of 
criminal justice because its purposes related to 
concerns extraneous to the criminal law.  The 
officer’s work in inventorying  the vehicle was 
incidental to police administrative procedures rather 
than to the arrest of the accused.  Therefore, it did 
not meet the requirements of a warrantless search 
and the inventory search breached s.8.
 
s.24(2)
Despite the breach resulting  from the inventory 
search, the fruits of that search were admissible 
under s.24(2):
 
The task for courts remains one of achieving a 
balance between individual  and societal 
interests with a view to determining whether the 
administration of justice would be brought into 
disrepute by admission of the evidence.  In my 
view, the evidence found in the “inventory 
search” which consists largely of additional 
trucking documents plus the potentially 
misleading  “decals” ought not to be excluded.  
Had the RCMP officers continued their post-
midnight search incident to arrest they would 
have been within their rights to do so, and the 
subject evidence would have been readily 
discoverable at that time. The subsequent 
inventory search for administrative purposes of 
an impounded truck that has already been 
searched (though less meticulously) should be 
classified as a technical breach with a minimal 
impact on the Charter-protected interests of the 
[accuseds].  The evidence ought to be available 
for whatever relevance it may have to assist in 
the resolution of the outstanding charges on their 
merits. [para. 54]
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE 
INVALIDATES PROBATION 
ORDER
R. v. Howse, 2010 NLCA 40
 
The accused was sentenced in 
Newfoundland Provincial Court to 
two years imprisonment and three 
years probation after pleading  guilty 
to two counts of break and enter (s.
348(1)(b) Criminal Code (CC)) and three counts of 
breach of recognizance (s.145(3) CC). About 19 
months later he was convicted of several more 
offences (s.355(b) CC x 3, s.430(1) CC x 2, and s.
4(1) Controlled Drugs and Substances Act) for which 
he was sentenced to six months imprisonment.
Th e C r o w n s u c c e s s f u l l y a r g u e d t o t h e 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal, with the accused’s 
consent, that the imposition of the six month 
sentence made the probation order invalid and 
therefore it should be set aside. Section 731 of the 
Criminal Code allows a court to impose a probation 
order in addition to imprisonment provided that the 
term of incarceration does not exceed two years. But 
this provision must be read in conjunction with s.
139(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release 
Act which requires two overlapping  sentences be 
treated as “one sentence”, starting  on the date that 
the first sentence commenced and ending  on the 
date the last sentence expired. “Where that 
unexpired ‘one sentence’ exceeds two years, a 
probation order may not be imposed, and any 
probation order that may have been properly 
imposed, in respect of any prior sentence that is a 
component part of the ‘one sentence’, becomes 
invalid,” said Justice Wells for the Court of Appeal.  
Here, the   deemed “one sentence”, exceeded two 
years. Thus, the probation order made for the break 
and enter and breach of recognizance offences, 
while valid at the time that it was made, became 
invalid when the second sentence of six months was 
imposed for the other offences. The Crown’s appeal 
was allowed and the probation order was set aside.
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BY THE BOOK:
s. 139(1) Corrections and Conditional 
Release Act 
Additional Sentences
Where a person who is subject to a 
sentence that has not expired 
receives an additional sentence, the 
person is, for the purposes of the 
Criminal Code, the Prisons and 
Reformatories Act and this Act, deemed to 
have been sentenced to one sentence 
commencing  at the beginning of the first of 
those sentences to be served and ending on 
the expiration of the last of them to be served.
Sentence 1
2 yrs (24 months) imprisonment
Imposed: July 16, 2007
Sentence 2
6 months
Imposed: Feb. 23, 2009
Deemed “one sentence” - 769 days = 2 years, 1 month, 7 days excluding end date
How it Works
s.139(1) CCRA - overlapping sentences
+ 3 years 
probation
(s.731 CC)
Probation order 
becomes invalid 
because s.139(1) 
CCRA deems the 
two overlapping 
sentences as “one 
sentence”, which 
exceeds 2 years. 
Under s.731 a 
probation order 
may only be 
imposed on a 
sentence not 
exceeding 2 years.
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PROBING PROBATION FACTS 
What is probation?
“An offender sentenced to a term of probation remains 
in the community, but is subject  to a number of 
conditions for the duration of the probation order. 
Some conditions are compulsory and apply to all 
offenders on probation. These include keeping  the 
peace and appearing  before the court when required to 
do so. The optional conditions vary from case to case, 
and can include performing  community service, 
abstaining  from the consumption of alcohol and 
attending  treatment. Violating  the conditions of a 
probation order is a criminal offence subject  to possible 
prosecution that could result in a  maximum sentence of 
imprisonment of two years. Probation is mandatory in 
cases where the accused is given a  conditional 
discharge or a suspended  sentence. Probation may be 
supervised or unsupervised.”
• The most frequently imposed sanction in adult 
criminal cases is probation, given 45% of the time. 
A term of imprisonment is given in 34% of cases 
while fines are given in 30% of cases;
• Crimes against the person are most likely to include 
a term of probation. Seventy five percent (75%) of 
guilty cases involving crimes against the person 
received probation while 57% of property crime 
offenders received probation. Administration of 
justice offences, such as fail to appear, breach of 
probation, unlawfully at large, and failing  to comply 
with orders, were given probation about 34% of the 
time;
• About 28% of adults receiving probation for crimes 
against the person were also sentenced to a term of 
custody;
• The most common adult probation length was 
between six months to a year (51%) followed by 
terms of probation between one to two years in 
length (31%);
• The longest term of probation an offender can 
receive is three years. This is a statutory limit 
prescribed by the Criminal Code, s732.2(2)(b):
“no probation  order shall continue in force for 
more than three years after the date on  which  the 
order came into force”
• The mean, or average, adult probation length was 
451 days. Aside from homicide and attempt murder, 
the longest average probation lengths attach to 
sexual offences*, such as sexual interference, sexual 
exploitation, voyeurism, incest, child luring, and 
making, distributing, possessing, and accessing 
child pornography (732 days) followed by robbery 
(686 days), sexual assault (665 days), and criminal 
harassment (619 days);
• The mean, or average, adult custodial sentence for 
breaching  probation was 29  days while the average 
fine given is $301;
• The mean, or average, youth (open or closed) 
custodial sentence for breaching probation was 48 
days. In Nunavut, 86.2% of youths found guilty 
received probation while in Saskatchewan that 
number dropped in half to 43.1%.
 PROBATION BY OFFENCE TYPE & LENGTH
Offence Type Percent probation Mean
(Average length)
Adult Youth Adult Youth
Criminal harassment 89.9% 67.1% 619 days 390 days
Common assault 80.1% 60.3% 399 days 348 days
Uttering threats 79.1% 70.6% 496 days 344 days
Other sex offences* 73.6% 74.1% 732 days 516 days
Major assault 70.4% 71.8% 515 days 381 days
Mischief 69.0% 60.2% 375 days 352 days
Sexual assault 68.3% 75.5% 686 days 503 days
Fraud 64.9% 65.9% 549 days 379 days
Break and enter 64.6% 75.3% 549 days 387 days
Weapons offences 54.2% 70.3% 481 days 382 days
Theft 52.0% 59.7% 406 days 341 days
Robbery 50.8% 76.2% 730 days 411 days
Disturb the peace 46.2% 45.5% 318 days 313 days
Possess stolen property 45.8% 66.8% 421 days 346 days
Prostitution 44.3% 50.0% 381 days x
Breach of probation 36.5% 47.5% 403 days 366 days
Drug possession 32.5% 48.1% 319 days 276 days
Drug trafficking 31.6% 78.4% 437 days 352 days
Fail to appear 25.8% 44.3% 356 days 374 days
Unlawfully at large 17.3 24.9% 375 days 346 days
Impaired driving 10.9% 26.2% 402 days 322 days
Source: Statistics Canada, Summer 2010, “Adult criminal court 
statistics, 2008/2009”, catalogue no. 85-002-X, Vol. 30, no. 2.
Source: Statistics Canada, Summer 2010, “Youth court statistics, 
2008/2009”, catalogue no. 85-002-X, Vol. 30, no. 2.
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POLICE REPORTED DATING 
VIOLENCE
A recently released Statistics Canada publication 
provides insight into dating  violence in Canada. The 
report, entitled “Police-reported dating violence in 
Canada, 2008”, was released in June 2010. 
Highlights of the report include:
• there were 22,798 incidents of dating  violence 
reported to Canadian police in 2008. This 
compares to 43,845 incidents of spousal 
violence reported during the same time period;
• dating  relationships accounted for 27% of all 
violent incidents perpetrated by intimate 
partners;
• dating  relationships accounted for 30% of all 
homicides perpetrated by intimate partners, 
while spousal and common law relationships 
accounted for the remaining 70%;
• 82% of victims reporting  dating  violence to 
police were female;
• for the five year reference period from 
2004-2008, police reported dating  violence has 
increased. Rates of dating  violence for female 
victims has increased 40% while rates for male 
victims increased 47%;
• the most frequently committed violent offence 
in dating  relationships was common assault 
while homicide was the least committed;
• 69% of dating  violence incidents reported to 
police resulted in charges;
• 71% of incidents involving  female victims 
resulted in charges while 57%  of incidents 
involving male victims resulted in charges;
• about 10% of male victims of dating  violence 
and 1% of female victims involved same-sex 
relationships;
• 57% of dating  violence occurs once the 
relationship has ended - it was perpetrated by a 
former partner;
• most dating  violence occurred in a private 
dwelling;
• the majority of victims of dating  violence (52%) 
reported no injury, did not involve the use of a 
weapon, nor physical force. 41% received 
minor physical injury (no professional medical 
treatment was required or only some first aid 
such as a band aid or ice) and 2% received 
major physical injury (requiring  professional 
medical attention at the scene or transportation 
to a medical facility). In 5% of incidents it was 
unknown whether injury to the victim was 
sustained;  
• 52% of dating  violence incidents involved no 
weapon, 40% involved the use of physical 
force, and 6% involved a weapon. In 2% of 
incidents it was unknown what method of 
violence was used;
• of the 1,307 incidents involving  weapons, 25 
involved a firearm, 409 involved a knife or 
other cutting  instrument, 190 involved a club or 
blunt instrument, and 683 involved other 
weapons, such as explosives, fire, motor 
vehicles, or other devices to poison.
Offence Type Number %
Homicide/Attempt 14 0.06%
Sexual Assault 648 2.84%
Major assault (level 2 & 3) 2,415 10.59%
Common assault (level 1) 11,438 50.17%
Forcible confinement 735 3.22%
Criminal Harassment 3,235 14.19%
Uttering threats 2,669 11.71%
Indecent or harassing phone calls 1,354 5.94%
Other violent offences 290 1.27%
Total Offences 22,798 100%
Location of dating violence %
Residence of victim 45%
Residence of accused 12%
Residence of neither victim or accused 14%
Not a private dwelling 21%
Unknown 8%
Source: Statistics Canada, Summer 2010, “Police-reported 
dating violence in Canada, 2008”, catalogue no. 85-002-X, 
Vol. 30, no. 2.
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BC’s NEW BODY ARMOUR 
CONTROL ACT
Effective July 1, 2010 British Columbia’s Body 
Armour Control Act (BACA) became law. 
What is body armour?
The meaning  of body armour is found in s.1 of the 
BACA. It states that "body armour" is:
(a) a garment or item designed, intended or 
adapted for the purpose of protecting the body 
from projectiles discharged from a firearm, as 
defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code, or
(b) a prescribed garment or item;
Schedule 2 of the Body Armour Control Regulation 
prescribes the additional following  garments as body 
armour:
(a) a garment or item designed, intended or 
adapted for the purpose of protecting the body 
from puncture or stab wounds intended to be 
inflicted by another person:
(b) panels or plates that
(i) protect the body from projectiles 
discharged from a firearm or puncture of 
stab wounds, and
(ii) are designed to be inserted into pockets 
of vests, jackets or other garments to 
create or enhance body armour.
Offences
There are several offences created under the BACA 
including  possession of body armour except under 
the authority of a permit (s.2(2)). The legislation 
provides an exemption to individuals from requiring 
a permit to possess body armour while performing 
the job for which the exemption is granted. These 
include licensed armoured car guards, private 
investigators, security consultants, security guards, 
body armour salespersons, peace officers, sheriffs, 
corrections officers, and conservation officers, and 
individuals who possess a valid firearms licence 
issued under the Firearms Act (Canada).
Under s.13(5) it is an offence for a person to 
“obstruct, impede or refuse to admit an inspector or 
a peace officer who is exercising  powers or 
performing  duties under this Act or a warrant issued 
under, or for the purposes of enforcing, this Act.”
Search
Section 21 authorizes the warrantless search for and 
seizure of body armour:
s.21 (1) If an inspector or a peace officer has 
reasonable grounds for believing  that a person is 
in possession of body armour in a public place 
and, on request of the inspector or peace officer, 
the person
(a) refuses or is unable to produce a valid body 
armour permit, and
(b) is unable to identify the basis on which he or 
she is exempt under section  2  (3) from the 
requirement to hold a body armour permit,
the inspector or peace officer, without a warrant, 
may search the person and any personal 
property in that person's possession and seize 
any body armour found.
(2) Section 23 (4) and sections 24 to 24.2 of the 
Offence Act apply in respect of body armour 
seized under subsection (1) of this section and, 
for the purposes of section 23 (4) of the Offence 
Act, an inspector is deemed to be a peace 
officer.
(3) If, under section 24 (2) (a) of the Offence Act, 
a justice orders that body armour referred to in 
subsection (2) of this section be detained, 
despite section 24 (3) of the Offence Act, the 
body armour may be detained for up to one year 
before an order under section 24 (5) of that Act, 
authorizing its continued detention, is required.
Public Protection
Section 10 of the BACA allows the Registrar of 
Security Services to immediately and without notice 
cancel or suspend a body armour permit if he or she 
considers it necessary to protect the pubic. Written 
notice of this decision along  with the reasons for it 
must then be provided to the permit holder as soon 
as practicable. The permit holder must then 
immediately surrender the permit and the body 
armour. 
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The Violation Ticket Administration and Fines 
Regulation has also been amended to permit the 
service of Violation Tickets for offences under the 
BACA. 
As well, an individual committing  an offence under 
s.13 could be liable on conviction to a fine of not 
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not longer 
than 6 months, or both. A business entity that 
commits an offence under s.13(2) is liable on 
conviction to a fine of not more than $100,000 or 
imprisonment for not longer than 6 months, or both.
A charge for an offence under s.13 may not be laid 
more than one year after the commission of the 
offence.
Application for a NEW    
Permit to Possess Body Armour 
Legal Name: (Surname) ______________________________________________________ (Given) ____________________________ (Middle) ________________________________________
Additional Name(s) (alias, maiden name, etc.): (Surname) ________________________________________(Given) _______________________ (Middle)______________________________
(Surname) ________________________________________(Given) _______________________ (Middle)______________________________
Date of Birth:                     ____________________________________________________________ Gender:   ! Male   ! Female
Citizenship:    ! I was born in Canada—attached is a clear copy of my birth certificate or valid Canadian Passport.
! I was not born in Canada but now have citizenship—attached is a copy of my valid Canadian Passport or Citizenship Certification Card.
! I was not born in Canada, but I am legally entitled to work in Canada.   Attached is a clear copy of my Record of Landing (IMM1000), 
Confirmation of Permanent Resident Document (IMM5292),  Permanent Resident Card,  OR
my current work or student permit which is numbered: #__________________ and expires (year/month/day)______________________ 
! I am a citizen of (name of country) __________________________________ and have attached copy of official documentation as proof.
Photo Identification: One clear copy of your photo ID is required - it must be current. Check off the type you are attaching:
! Driver’s Licence  ! Passport   ! BCID     ! Canadian Firearms Licence
! Canadian Permanent Resident Card       ! Canadian Native Status Card (must have photo)
! Valid Government-Issued Photo ID: (describe) __________________________________________________________________
Physical Description: (this information will appear on your permit) Height (ft./inches or cms): ________   Weight (lbs or kgs):_____________   
Hair Colour: ! black   ! blonde  ! brown  ! red  ! gray  ! bald                  
Eye Colour: ! blue    ! brown   ! black   ! green ! hazel
Contact Information: (your contact information will not appear on your permit)
Residential Address: Apt.#__________   Street Address _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________   
City/Town:  _______________________________________________________________ Province:  _____________________ Postal Code:________________________
Mailing Address: If your mailing address is different than your residential address, please provide it below:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phone: ( ________ ) __________________________   E-Mail Address ______________________________________________________________________________________________
! Yes, send an electronic copy of my permit to this e-mail address when the original permit is mailed to me.
Photograph (this photo will appear on your permit):
! Yes, I have attached a passport-quality photo of myself that has been taken within the last 12 months.
Criminal History:  
! No    ! Yes ... I have a criminal record. 
PART 2:   APPLICANT INFORMATION
Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General
Policing and Community Safety Branch, Security Programs and Police Technology Division
PO Box 9217 Stn Prov Govt, Victoria  BC  V8W 9J1  
Phone: (250) 387-6981 (if outside Victoria, call through Enquiry BC: Vancouver 604 660-2421 / elsewhere in BC, toll-free 1-800-663-7867)      
Fax: (250) 387-4454   E-mail: sgspdsec@gov.bc.ca     Security Industry and Licensing website: www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/securityindustry
FORM #SPD0600
PSSG10-007 (07/2010) 
PART 1:   FEES & TERMS
PAYMENT MADE BY:      ! bank-issued certified cheque or money order made payable to the Minister of Finance 
! credit card (attach Authorized Credit Card Usage Form SPD0606)    DO NOT SEND CASH - PERSONAL CHEQUES NOT ACCEPTED
TERM OF PERMIT & FEE: 5 Years - $90 TOTAL ENCLOSED: $ _________________
(year/month/day) 
(check ["] one)
(check ["] one)
Before applying, read, understand and be able to comply with all requirements as set out under the Body Armour Control Act 
and Regulations, and as outlined on the Security Industry and Licensing website:   www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/securityindustry
Fees cannot be refunded.
DID YOU KNOW...
... that on March 26, 2009 a private 
members bill (Bill C-349) introduced by MP 
Dawn Black (NDP: New Westminster-
Coquitlam, BC) received first reading  in the 
House of Commons. The bill proposed to 
amend the Criminal Code and make it a 
criminal offence to use body armour while 
committing  or attempting  to commit an 
indictable offence or during  flight after 
committing  or attempting  to commit such 
offence. Body armour would have been 
defined as “any material worn by an 
individual for the purpose of protecting  his 
or her body from gunfire or stabbing, 
regardless of whether the material is worn 
alone or is used as a complement to a 
garment or other material.” A first offence 
would have brought a minimum jail 
sentence of six months and a maximum of 
five years. A second or subsequent offence 
would result in a one year minimum 
sentence. All sentences would have been 
consecutive to any other punishment arising 
out of the same event or series of events. 
However, pursuant to a decision made by 
the Speaker of the House on March 3, 2010 
the bill was not maintained. 
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ARMOURED VEHICLES IN B.C.:
PROPOSED BILL 16 (2010)
The Br i t i sh Columbia 
government has passed Bill 
16, the Armoured Vehicle 
a n d A f t e r - M a r k e t 
Compartment Control Act, 
that will, once in force, establish the requirement for 
a person who operates an armoured vehicle to hold 
a permit or, in some cases, be exempted. “Armoured 
passenger vehicles, the evidence shows, facilitate 
gang  and gun violence”, said the Honourable Mike 
de Jong  when introducing  the Bill. “[Armoured 
vehicles] embolden gang  members, give them a 
feeling  of invincibility and a feeling  that they can act 
violently and with impunity.” As well, this Bill will 
prohibit after-market compartments in vehicles, 
unless the vehicle owner is exempt from the 
prohibition, and require persons installing  after-
market compartments to report each installation to 
the police. “These after-market compartments are 
used by gang  members to hide not just weapons but 
also drugs and cash, and to further illegal activities,” 
said de Jong.
In the Bill, an “armoured vehicle” is defined as “a 
motor vehicle manufactured or adapted for the 
purpose of protecting  its occupants from explosions 
caused by explosive devices or from projectiles 
discharged from a firearm, as defined in section 2 of 
the Criminal Code.” An “after-market compartment” 
is “a compartment in a vehicle, which ... (a) is not 
part of the manufacturer's design of or equipment for 
the vehicle, and (b) is incorporated into the 
equipment or structure of the vehicle after it has left 
the factory in which it was manufactured.” 
Section 2 of the legislation will prohibit the 
operation of an armoured vehicle except under 
permit. The prohibition, however, would not apply 
to a peace officer, a security worker licence holder 
whose employment involves operating  an armoured 
vehicle, armoured car operators, or a person 
exempted by regulation. Section 7 will ban the 
ownership, operation, or use of a vehicle that 
contains an after-market compartment, unless 
exempted under regulation. And anyone who installs 
an after-market compartment in a vehicle will be 
required to immediately contact the nearest 
provincial or municipal police office and provide 
the officer in charge with the name and address of 
Armoured police vehicle 
on display at the 2010 
Abbotsford International 
Airshow.
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the vehicle’s owner; the make, 
model, and year of the vehicle; 
and the location in the vehicle 
where the compartment has been 
placed and how it can be 
opened. Under s.12, a person 
who contravenes either ss. 2 or 7 
commits an offence and is liable 
on conviction to a fine of not 
more than $10,000 and/or six 
months in jail. If it is a business 
entity that commits the offence 
the maximum fine will rise to 
$100,000. The time limit for 
laying  charges will be one year 
after the date of the act or 
omission that constituted the 
offence. 
Police Powers
Section 10 of the Bill will provide 
police with powers of seizure:
s.10(1) If a peace officer has 
r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s f o r 
believing that a person is operating an armoured 
vehicle and, on request of the peace officer, the 
person
(a) refuses or is unable to produce a valid 
armoured vehicle permit, and
(b) is unable to satisfy the peace officer that the 
person is exempt ... from the requirement to 
hold an armoured vehicle permit,
the peace officer, without a warrant, may seize 
the motor vehicle and take it to a secure place 
for the purpose of preserving  the motor vehicle 
until a search warrant is obtained.
(2) If
(a) a peace officer has reasonable grounds for 
believing that a person owns or is operating  or 
using  a vehicle that contains an after-market 
compartment, and
(b) on request of the peace officer, the person is 
unable to satisfy the peace officer that the person 
is exempt under the regulations from the 
prohibition in section 7 (1),
the peace officer, without a warrant, may seize 
the vehicle and take it to a secure place for the 
purpose of preserving the vehicle until a search 
warrant is obtained.
If a vehicle is seized under this 
section a report to a justice will 
be required under B.C.’s Offence 
Act. But the vehicle can be 
detained for up to a year before 
continued detention is required. 
Normally a thing  seized may only 
be detained for three (3) months 
under the Offence Act before an 
order for continued detention is 
required. 
If a vehicle contains an after-
marker compartment and the 
owner is not exempt, under s.11 a 
peace officer may order the 
owner, operator, or user of the 
vehicle to cease operating  or 
using  it until the after-market 
compartment has been removed.
Section 12 will create an offence 
for a person to obstruct, impede 
or refuse to admit a peace officer 
who is exercising  powers or performing  duties under 
this Act or under a warrant issued for the purposes of 
enforcing this Act. 
On June 3, 2010 this Act received Royal Assent but 
is not yet in force. 
“[T]here is a developing, emerging 
phenomenon where people — 
particularly, it seems, those 
engaged in criminal activity — 
have decided that as a way to 
enhance their own feelings of 
invincibility, they will purchase 
vehicles and have them altered 
and have armoured plating 
attached to them and in effect 
create a form of civilian tank — a 
tank on the road that they can 
drive around. If they become 
involved in violence, gunfights or 
that sort of thing or are 
confronted by other elements, 
criminal elements with whom they 
have disputes, they will feel better 
protected. It gives these people a 
sense of invincibility. It seems 
clear that it is influencing their 
behaviour and, as a result, putting 
the vast majority of law-abiding 
citizens at risk in the process.” - 
Honourable Mike de Jong       
(Monday May 3, 2010)
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Assaults Against Police
“Assaults on peace officers are to be 
denounced and deterred, for their 
tasks are difficult enough without 
being subjected to abusive behaviour 
of the kind exhibited by the [accused].” – Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal Justice Bateman in R. v. McArthur, 2010 
SKCA 90 at para. 5, setting aside a one year global custodial sentence and 
substituting a sentence of 24 months for assaulting police plus six months 
consecutive for other offences (less remand time of course) . 
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CONSECUTIVE DRIVING 
PROHIBITIONS FIT
R. v. Irvine, 2010 ABCA 212
After being  charged with driving  over 
80mg% in June 2006, the accused 
was released on bail by a judge. In 
March 2008, while still on judicial 
interim release, he was involved in a 
head on collision, seriously injuring  two occupants 
in the other car. He refused a blood sample, but his 
hospital blood analysis was 193mg%. He was 
charged with refusing  a breath test and driving  over 
80mg% from this incident. He subsequently pled 
guilty to driving  over 80mg% for the 2006 incident, 
and refusing  a breath test and driving  over 80mg% 
for the 2008  incident. These incidents were his third 
and fourth convictions for similar offences. The 
Alberta Provincial Court judge accepted a joint 
submission for a six month jail sentence. But he also 
imposed two 3-year driving  prohibitions for each set 
of offences to be served consecutively. The accused 
appealed this sentence to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred in 
imposing consecutive driving prohibitions. 
Driving Prohibitions
Section 259 of the Criminal Code provides for 
mandatory driving  prohibitions for first, second and 
subsequent offences: 
Since these were the accused’s third and fourth 
convictions the judge was required to give him a 3-
year driving  prohibition. And the consecutive 
sentences were not unfit. “These convictions were 
for two separate offences separated by a number of 
years,” said the Court. “Indeed, to have directed 
concurrent prohibitions would result in the 
[accused] having  no prohibition for the second 
conviction, and would violate the spirit of section 
259(1)(c) which requires a three-year prohibition for 
each subsequent offence.” The accused’s appeal on 
this ground was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
BLOOD DELIVERY VEHICLE MAY 
NOW USE HIGH OCCUPANCY 
VEHICLE LANES
On June 25, 2010, British Columbia’s Motor Vehicle 
Act Regulations, ss.42.01 - 42.03,  was amended to 
allow blood delivery vehicles the use of high 
occupancy lanes. To be eligible, a vehicle must meet 
the following definition:
Blood delivery vehicles now enjoy the same 
exemptions for using  high occupancy lanes as the 
following:
• the driver of a marked vehicle responding  to a 
disabled vehicle or another emergency on the 
laned roadway where the high occupancy 
vehicle lane is located;
• the driver of an emergency vehicle;
• a peace officer on active duty;
• an operator of a cycle, motor cycle, taxi or 
handy dart vehicle. 
Cycles, however, do not enjoy the use of high 
occupancy lanes on the Trans-Canada Highway.
Mandatory order of prohibition
s.259(1) Criminal Code
When an offender is convicted of an offence committed under 
section 253 [impaired/over 80mg%] or 254 [refusal] ... the court 
that sentences the offender shall, in  addition to any other 
punishment that may be imposed for that offence, make an order 
prohibiting the offender from operating a motor vehicle on any 
street, road, highway or other public place, or from operating a 
vessel or an aircraft or railway equipment, as the case may be,
(a) for a first offence, during a period of not more than three 
years plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to 
imprisonment, and not less than one year;
(b) for a second offence, during a period of not more than 
five years plus any period to which the offender is sentenced 
to imprisonment, and not less than two years; and
(c) for each subsequent offence, during a period of not 
less than three years plus any period to which the 
offender is sentenced to imprisonment.
“blood delivery vehicle” means a motor vehicle that 
is 
(a) owned or operated by or on behalf of the 
Canadian Blood Services, 
(b) clearly marked as a Canadian Blood Services 
vehicle, and 
(c) used to transport blood or blood products. 
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VEHICLE INSPECTION DOES NOT 
RENDER RANDOM SAFETY 
RELATED STOP ARBITRARY
R. v. Kenyon, 2010 MBCA 70               
 
The police noticed that a semi-tractor, 
without a trailer, bearing  out-of 
province licence plates was not 
displaying  an International Fuel Tax 
Agreement (IFTA) sticker.  The police 
pulled the semi over to verify regulatory compliance 
but the accused was unable to supply a driver’s 
licence or any documentation to confirm his 
identity, and was also unable to provide an IFTA 
licence even though he said he had paid for it. 
Furthermore, his daily log  books were incomplete. 
The accused was asked to exit the semi so the police 
could search inside it to look for documents relating 
to the vehicle’s use that would clarify the situation. 
The officer had no suspicions of any criminal 
activity. But when he opened one of the drawers he 
observed used pipes with residue, typically used by 
persons to smoke cocaine or methamphetamine.
The officer stopped his search, arrested the accused 
for drug  possession, read him his rights, and gave the 
police caution. The officer went back into the semi 
to search incident to the arrest for evidence on the 
possession charge. He noticed that the cabin ceiling 
had been altered and, based on his past experience, 
believed that the ceiling  may contain a hidden 
compartment. He again left the vehicle, arrested the 
accused for trafficking  and possession for the 
purpose of trafficking, and re-advised him of his 
Charter rights and the police caution. The officer re-
entered the semi to search for evidence on the new 
charges.   Inside the ceiling, police found 43 bags 
containing  about 195,000 ecstasy tablets and 40 
one-kilogram bricks of cocaine.  The accused was 
arrested a third time, for possessing  ecstasy and 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. Again, he was 
read his Charter rights and given the police caution.
At trial in the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench the 
trial judge found that the accused’s ss.8  and s.  9 
Charter rights were not breached as a result of the 
stop and warrantless search of the semi-tractor 
cabin. Up until the contaminated drug  pipes were 
observed, the purpose of the traffic stop and search 
of the vehicle was to ensure compliance with 
commercial vehicle regulations.  
The judge rejected the accused’s argument that the 
initial stop of the vehicle was arbitrary because the 
police were using it as a pretext to search for drugs:  
I am satisfied the initial stopping  of the vehicle 
was not arbitrary. I accept [the officer’s]evidence 
that he decided to stop the vehicle to check for 
compliance with IFTA. I also accept his evidence 
that he planned to check the driver’s licence, the 
vehicle registration, the log books and 
supporting documents.  Section 76.1 of The 
Highway Traffic Act authorizes a peace officer 
acting in the course of his duties to stop a 
vehicle to make inquiries and request 
documentation generally in relation to the 
driver’s identity, licence, registration, sobriety, 
and mechanical fitness of the vehicle.  Random 
stops are justified because of the safety aims of 
highway traffic legislation, provided the officer is 
acting lawfully and within the scope of the 
legislation.  [para. 20]
What did the officer see?
The officer noticed the rear air dam above the 
sleeper berth had been sealed. Based on his 
experience, he thought this was consistent 
with the existence of a false compartment in 
the vehicle. He also noticed the upholstery in 
the ceiling did not go under the plastic trim 
and appeared to have been folded to hide 
something. He pulled down the ceiling 
covering and noticed there was a false 
compartment. He was able to unscrew some 
bolts to gain access to the compartment where 
he saw numerous bags of what appeared 
to be ecstasy pills and bricks 
of cocaine. In all, police 
found 40 kilos of cocaine 
and 19 bags containing 
about 195,000 ecstasy 
tablets in the false 
compartment.
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Nor did the accused’s detention at the scene become 
arbitrary after the officer decided to conduct an 
inspection of the vehicle:
Commercial trucking is a highly regulated 
industry.  Commercial carriers are subject to a 
plethora of federal and provincial regulations 
and obligations, including those relating to fuel 
tax payments, the maintenance of log  books and 
supporting  documents.  The authority to detain 
commercial carriers on a highway arises by 
necessary implication from the power to 
conduct inspections under the federal 
Commercial Vehicle Drivers Hours of Service 
Regulations ... and The Highway Traffic Act. 
[para. 22]
The judge concluded that the officer’s request for 
documents was within the scope of his authority and 
the accused’s inability to produce satisfactory 
documentation provided reasonable grounds for the 
officer to conduct a further inspection to ensure 
compliance with the HTA and the regulations. 
Further, as soon as the evidence of a criminal 
offence was observed, the police had authority to 
detain under their power of arrest.
As for the search, the police had authority under s. 
241.1(4) of the HTA to conduct the inspection of the 
vehicle. All of the required documentation had not 
been produced and the documentation that was 
produced was incomplete. The officer had 
reasonable grounds to suspect the Act and 
regulations relating  to commercial trucking  was not 
complied with. Once the drug  paraphernalia was 
discovered there were reasonable grounds to believe 
that an offence of possessing  a controlled substance 
had been or was being  committed. The arrest gave 
the police authority to continue the search of the 
vehicle as a search incidental to arrest because it 
was reasonable to believe that drugs might be found 
near where they were used. There was no obligation 
to obtain a search warrant once the drug 
paraphernalia had been found in the course of the 
regulatory inspection. The judge held that the 
accused’s rights under s.8 of the Charter were not 
infringed. The accused was convicted of possessing 
ecstacy and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
He was sentenced to 12 years in prison.
The accused then appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal arguing  the trial judge erred in holding  that 
his rights under ss.8  and 9 of the Charter were not 
breached. Justice Chartier, authoring  the unanimous 
judgment, however, agreed with the trial judge that 
there were no Charter violations when the police 
initially stopped and then searched the semi to 
ensure compliance with commercial vehicle 
legislation:
The law recognizes broad powers for search and 
inspection of commercial vehicles when the 
purpose is regulatory oversight as opposed to 
criminal investigation. As the roadside detention 
was authorized by s.  76.1(1) of The  Highway 
Traffic Act, ... (the HTA), there was no need to 
inform the accused of his right to counsel until 
his arrest on the drug  charges.  The warrantless 
search of the vehicle for commercial documents 
during  the inspection was authorized by both 
federal (s.  18(2) of the Commercial Vehicle 
Drivers Hours of Service Regulations,  1994 ... 
and provincial legislation (s.  241.1(4) of the 
HTA), and it was carried out in a reasonable 
manner. Furthermore, an officer may open 
compartments inside a vehicle to look for motor 
safety documents required to be produced by 
law when a motorist fails to produce same ... 
[reference omitted, para. 7)  
And even if there was a Charter breach, the Court of 
Appeal would not have excluded the evidence 
under s.24(2). The accused had a reduced 
expectation of privacy in a commercial motor 
vehicle and the relevant factors favoured admission 
of the drug  evidence. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor's note: Supplemental trial judge’s reasons 
extracted from R. v. Kenyon, 2009 MBQB 259
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SENTENCING PROCESS CAN 
ADDRESS CHARTER BREACHES
R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6
After receiving  a tip about an 
intoxicated driver, the police initiated 
a high-speed pursuit with the 
accused.  He attempted to evade the 
police cruisers and dangerously 
reversed his car toward the officer’s vehicle. The 
accused came to an abrupt stop and, with a gun and 
flashlight pointed towards him, was ordered out of 
the vehicle with his hands up. He didn’t comply and 
instead placed his feet back inside the vehicle, 
clutching  the steering  wheel and door frame.  An 
officer grabbed him and punched him in the head to 
prevent him from driving  away and striking  another 
officer standing  in front of the vehicle. The accused 
let go of the steering  wheel and reached out to an 
officer, who then struck him in the head with his fist 
a second time, pulled him out of the car, and 
wrestled him onto the ground.  He was punched in 
the head a third time and pinned face down on the 
pavement, but refused to offer up his hands to be 
cuffed. He was then punched twice in the back, 
breaking  his ribs and puncturing  one of his lungs. 
No recordings were made of this interaction despite 
the presence of video cameras in the cars. He was 
transported to the detachment where he provided 
two breath samples well over the legal blood 
alcohol limit. No record was made of the force used 
during  the arrest, drawing  of a weapon, or of the 
accused’s injuries.  Although there were no obvious 
signs of injury and the accused did not expressly 
request medical assistance, he did state twice that he 
was hurt and was observed crying  and saying: “I 
can’t breathe.” No attempts were made to provide 
the accused with medical attention. He was released 
the following  morning  and went to hospital where it 
was learned that he had broken ribs and a collapsed 
lung requiring emergency surgery.  
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
accused pled guilty to impaired driving  under s. 
253(a) of the Criminal  Code and flight from police 
under s.249.1(1). But he requested a stay of 
proceedings, submitting  that the police breached his 
Charter rights because they used excessive force in 
arresting  him, failed to properly report his injuries, 
and failed to obtain medical assistance for him. If a 
stay was not granted, the accused wanted a reduced 
sentence to remedy the Charter  breaches.  The trial 
judge found violations of the accused’s ss.7 and 
11(d) rights. The judge found the first and second 
punches were lawful; the first necessary to remove 
the accused from the vehicle and prevent him from 
driving  away or causing  harm to the other officer 
and the second necessary to subdue him and force 
him to the ground when he was non-compliant.  
However, in the judge’s view, the third punch to the 
head and the two punches to the back were 
unwarranted and excessive. As a remedy, the judge 
refused to enter a stay, instead reducing  the 
accused’s sentence. Rather than giving  him a typical 
sentence of 6 to 18  months incarceration, using  s.
24(1) of the Charter he imposed a 12 month 
conditional discharge with a one year driving 
prohibition.  
The Crown’s appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal  
was unsuccessful. A majority of the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the trial judge did not make a 
palpable and overriding  error in holding  that the use 
of force was excessive in the circumstances, even 
though they would not have necessarily made the 
same finding. The judge considered relevant factors, 
that the events happened quickly, and that the 
accused was uncooperative and intoxicated. The 
majority would not interfere with the ruling  that the 
excessive force, failure to report injuries, and failure 
to obtain medical care was a s.7 breach. As well, the 
Court of Appeal upheld the granting  of a sentence 
reduction as a Charter remedy under s.24(1) only if 
the violation somehow mitigated the seriousness of 
the offence or if it imposed additional punishment or 
hardship on the accused (as was the case here, since 
the accused had suffered broken ribs and a 
punctured lung). But the majority found a sentence 
falling  below a statutorily mandated minimum could 
not be ordered. The accused’s conditional discharge 
was set aside for the impaired driving  offence since 
there was a minimum fine of $600 for a first offence. 
The evading  a police officer offence had no 
minimum punishment and the majority did not 
interfere with the conditional discharge ordered on 
it. Justice Côté, in dissent, agreed that a sentence 
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reduction could be available in some circumstances 
to remedy a Charter  breach but could not reduce a 
s e n t e n c e b e l ow a s t a t u t o r y 
min imum.  However, he had 
difficulty accepting  that the Charter 
breaches were so egregious that they 
wa r r a n t e d t h e r e m e dy o f a 
conditional discharge on the evading 
police offence and would have re-
sentenced the accused.  
Both the Crown and the accused appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
Excessive Force
 
The unanimous Supreme Court concluded that the 
trial judge had made no palpable and overriding 
error in his findings that the police had used 
excessive force at the time of the accused’s arrest. 
Justice  Lebel, writing  the Court’s opinion, described 
the law regarding police use of force as follows:
[P]olice officers do not have an unlimited power 
to inflict harm on a person in the course of their 
duties.  While, at times, the 
police may have to resort to 
force in order to complete an 
arrest or prevent an offender 
from escaping  police custody, 
the allowable degree of force to 
be used remains constrained by 
t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f 
proportionality, necessity and 
reasonableness.  Courts must guard against the 
illegitimate use of power by the police against 
members of our society, given its grave 
consequences.
The legal constraints on a police officer’s use of 
force are deeply rooted in our common law 
tradition and are enshrined in the Criminal Code 
[such as s. 25 of the Code]. ... 
Section 25(1) essentially provides that a police 
officer is justified in using force to effect a lawful 
arrest, provided that he or she acted on 
reasonable and probable grounds and used only 
“[P]olice officers do not 
have an unlimited power to 
inflict harm on a person in 
the course of their duties.”  
R. v. Nasogaluak Argument Grid
Argument Crown Defence
Excessive Force • in concluding there was excessive force the trial 
judge failed to assess the degree of force used by 
police against the legal standard found in ss.25 
and 27 of the Criminal Code and in the relevant 
case law.
•  the Court of Appeal correctly reviewed and 
applied the legal principles on excessive force and 
the s.7 Charter breach finding was proper.
Use of sentence 
reduction as a Charter 
remedy
• a sentence reduction might be appropriate but s.
24(1) of the Charter should not be used to 
circumvent the statutory and common law 
principles of sentencing;
• reduced sentence must still fall within the range of 
appropriate sentences for the offence charged;
• must not shift focus of the sentencing from the 
offender’s culpability and gravity of offence to the 
conduct of state officials. 
• a sentence reduction as a s.24(1) Charter remedy 
should be available;
• the court’s broad discretion under s.24(1) permits a 
sentence reduce a sentence below the statutory 
minimum when necessary to provide effective 
Charter relief; 
• the sentencing principles in the Criminal Code 
should not impede an individual exercising a right 
to a meaningful Charter remedy;
• a broad interpretation of s.24(1) should be adopted 
that would allow for the reduction of sentences 
below the regular range of appropriate sentences in 
order to remedy a Charter breach. 
Legality & fitness of 
sentence
• conditional discharge for impaired driving was 
illegal because Criminal Code provides for a 
minimum sentence;
• conditional discharge for evading police, although 
legal, was inadequate and therefore unfit. The 
offence was serious, the accused acted 
deliberately, and the public interest required a 
period of incarceration.  
• conditional discharge for the offence of impaired 
driving should be restored and the Court of Appeal 
erred in substituting a $600 fine. 
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as much force as was 
n e c e s s a r y i n t h e 
circumstances. That is not 
the end of the matter.  
Section 25(3) also prohibits 
a police officer from using a 
greater degree of force, i.e. 
that which is intended or 
likely to cause death or 
gr ievous bodi ly harm, 
unless he or she believes 
that it is necessary to 
protect him- or herself, or 
another person under his or 
her protection, from death 
o r g r i e v o u s b o d i l y 
harm.  The officer’s belief 
must be objectively reasonable. This means that 
the use of force under s. 25(3) is to be judged on 
a subjective-objective basis.  If force of that 
degree is used to prevent a suspect from fleeing 
to avoid a lawful arrest, then it is justified under 
s. 25(4), subject to the limitations described 
above and to the requirement that the flight 
could not reasonably have been prevented in a 
less violent manner.
Police actions should not be judged against a 
standard of perfection. It must be remembered 
that the police engage in dangerous and 
demanding work and often have to react quickly 
to emergencies.   Their actions should be judged 
in light of these exigent circumstances. ...  
[references omitted, paras. 32-35]
Whether or not the trial judge cited the relevant case 
law and provisions of the Criminal Code, he adhered 
to the correct legal principles in deciding  whether 
the force was excessive. “Even taking  into account 
the fact that these events occurred over a very brief 
period of time and that the police had to make hasty 
decisions to respond to the situation at hand, in my 
opinion, the Court of Appeal did not err when it 
found that the police had used more force than was 
necessary in the circumstances,” said Justice Lebel. 
Further, the officers’ conduct amounted to a s.7 
Charter violation.  Leaving  aside the question of 
whether police officers may have an affirmative duty 
to obtain medical assistance for persons under their 
care, the substantial interference with the accused’s 
physical and psychological integrity upon his arrest 
and detention engaged s.7. “The 
excessive use of force by the police 
officers, compounded by the failure 
of those same officers to alert their 
superiors to the extent of the injuries 
they inflicted on [the accused] and 
their failure to ensure that he 
received medical attention, posed a 
very real threat to [the accused’s] 
security of the person that was not in 
accordance with any principle of 
fundamental justice,” stated the 
Court.   
 
Sentence Reduction as Charter Remedy
The Supreme Court examined the relationship 
between the sentencing  provisions of the Criminal 
Code and the remedy section of the Charter, 
particularly in the context of responding  to excessive 
use of force by police. The Court ruled that in 
exceptional cases a sentence reduction is available 
as a form of Charter relief under s.24(1). But 
generally, the consequences of a Charter breach can 
be addressed through the sentencing  process itself. 
Of course, sentencing  has a constitutional 
dimension; s.12 of the Charter forbids the imposition 
of cruel and unusual punishment (ie. a grossly 
disproportionate sentence that would outrage 
society’s standards of decency).  The Criminal Code 
sentencing  provisions provide judges with a broad 
discretion in crafting  a sentence tailored to the 
nature of the offence and the circumstances of the 
offender, subject to case law, the Criminal Code, and 
the Charter.  Any mitigating  or aggravating  factors 
will then increase or decrease the sentence. Thus, 
using  their broad discretion under the Criminal 
Code, it may be appropriate for a judge to address a 
Charter breach when passing  sentence without 
resorting  to s.24(1) of the Charter. “If the facts 
alleged to constitute a Charter breach are related to 
one or more of the relevant principles of sentencing, 
then the sentencing  judge can properly take those 
facts into account in arriving  at a fit sentence,” said 
the Court. “It would be absurd to suggest that simply 
because some facts also tend to suggest a violation 
of the offender’s Charter rights, they could no longer 
“Police actions should not be 
judged against a standard of 
perfection. It must be 
remembered that the police 
engage in dangerous and 
demanding work and often have 
to react quickly to emergencies.  
Their actions should be judged 
in light of these exigent 
circumstances.”  
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be considered relevant mitigating 
factors in the determination of a fit 
sentence.” The Court continued: 
[T]he sentencing regime under 
C a n a d i a n l a w m u s t b e 
implemented within, and not 
apart from, the framework of the 
Charter. Sentencing  decisions are 
always subject to constitutional 
scrutiny.  A sentence cannot be 
“fit” if it does not respect the 
fundamenta l va lues enshr ined in the 
Charter.  Thus, incidents alleged to constitute a 
Charter violation can be considered in 
sentencing, provided that they bear the 
necessary connection to the sentencing exercise.  
As mitigating factors, the circumstances of the 
breach would have to al ign with the 
circumstances of the offence or the offender, as 
required by s. 718.2 of the Code. Naturally, the 
more egregious the breach, the more attention 
the court will likely pay to it in determining  a fit 
sentence. [para. 48]
And further:
 
Indeed, s. 718  of the Criminal Code describes 
the fundamental purpose of sentencing as that of 
contributing to “respect for the law and the 
maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe 
society”.  This function must be understood as 
providing scope for sentencing judges to 
consider not only the actions of the offender, but 
also those of state actors.  Provided that the 
impugned conduct relates to the individual 
offender and the circumstances of his or her 
offence, the sentencing process includes 
consideration of society’s collective interest in 
ensuring  that law enforcement agents respect the 
rule of law and the shared values of our society. 
[para. 49]
Even though excessive force by the police can be 
remedied through a reduction in sentence by 
applying  the sentencing  provisions of the Criminal 
Code, the Supreme Court did not foreclose the use 
of the remedial provision of s.24(1) of the Charter in 
exceptional cases. “Sentence reduction outside 
statutory limits, under s. 24(1) of the Charter, may be 
the sole effective remedy for some particularly 
egregious form of misconduct by state agents in 
relation to the offence and to the 
offender,” said Justice Lebel. “In that 
case, the validity of the law would 
not be at stake, the sole concern 
being  the specific conduct of those 
state agents.”
Legality & Fitness of Sentence
Although the Alberta Court of 
Appeal did not need to rely on s.
24(1) it nonetheless crafted a fit and 
appropriate sentence in recognizing  the serious acts 
of the police officers and addressing  the 
circumstances of the accused while remaining 
within the statutory parameters of the Criminal Code. 
All appeals were dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
“[I]ncidents alleged to 
constitute a Charter 
violation can be considered 
in sentencing, provided 
that they bear the 
necessary connection to 
the sentencing exercise.”  
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Drugs: Possession v. Production
“Possession is not an included 
o f fe n ce i n p ro d u c t i o n b u t 
i n vo l ve m e n t i n p ro d u c t i o n 
generally also results in possession. 
Possession as defined in s.  4(3) of the Criminal Code 
requires both knowledge and a measure of control. 
Production involves some active participation in the 
growing of the plants, which includes assisting in 
maintaining the environment of the growing plants 
with intent to help their development.” - British 
Columbia Court of Appeal Justice Mackenzie in R. v. 
Rong, 2010 BCCA 165. at para. 10.. 
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Others intervening in the Nasogaluak appeal:
๏ Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada
๏ Attorney General of Ontario
๏ Attorney General of Manitoba
๏ Canadian Civil Liberties Association
๏ Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario)
๏ Criminal Trial Lawyers’ Association
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VICTIM’S MOTHER NOT A  
PERSON IN AUTHORITY: 
VOIR DIRE NOT NEEDED
R. v. S.G.T., 2010 SCC 20
The victim, a teenager,  reported to 
pol ice that the accused, her 
stepfather, touched her in a sexually 
inappropriate manner. The accused 
agreed to be interviewed by the 
police and at the end of the interview he wrote an 
apology to the victim on the police statement form. 
He was charged with sexual assault. Later, but 
before trial, the victim’s mother sent a number of 
emails to the accused requesting  consent for the 
victim to leave the country for a visit. In one of the 
emails the accused again apologized, writing  in part, 
“I am so, so sorry if I caused her [the victim] 
emotional pain.”  
At trial in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench 
the victim testified. As well, the Crown wanted to 
enter the accused’s confession to police, including 
the written apology, and the email he sent to the 
victim’s mother. On a voir dire, the trial judge found 
that the police officer had offered an inducement by 
implying  that the matter was not significant, that it 
was extremely minor, that the accused would not 
lose his job, and all that was necessary was an 
apology and that the accused would not be charged 
if he did so. The statement was ruled involuntary and 
therefore inadmissible.  The email, however, was 
admitted without a voir dire and, in the trial judge’s 
view, was “a confession of guilt 
and r emor se .” De sp i t e t he 
accused’s denial that he sexually 
assaulted his stepdaughter, the trial 
judge disbelieved him and a 
conviction of sexual assault 
followed.
 
The accused challenged his 
c o n v i c t i o n b e f o r e t h e 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. The 
Court of Appeal found the trial 
judge erred in failing  to conduct a 
vo i r d i r e t o de te rmine the 
admissibility of the email. In its view, among  other 
things, the confessions rule, or derived confessions 
rule, may have provided a basis for the exclusion of 
the email if the mother could be characterized as a 
person in authority. If there was a connection 
between the inadmissible confession to police and 
the email, such that the accused sent the e-mail as a 
result of the inducement offered by the police officer 
some five weeks earlier, then the email may be 
inadmissible as well. Thus a voir dire was required. 
The conviction was set aside and a new trial was 
ordered.  The Crown then appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada.  
Confessions Rule
Justice Charron, authoring  the judgment for the five 
member majority, examined the common law rules 
relating to the admissibility of  confessions:  
The distinction between an admission and a 
confession is apposite here. Under the rules of 
evidence, statements made by an accused are 
admissions by an opposing party and, as such, 
fall into an exception to the hearsay rule.  They 
are admissible for the truth of their contents.  
When statements are made by an accused to 
ordinary persons, such as friends or family 
members, they are presumptively admissible 
without the necessity of a voir dire.  It is only 
where the accused makes a statement to a 
“person in authority”, that the Crown bears the 
onus of proving the voluntariness of the 
statement as a prerequisite to its admission.  
This, of course, is the confessions rule. 
 ... ... ...
A person in authority is typically 
a person who is “formally 
engaged in the arrest, detention, 
examination or prosecution of the 
accused”. Importantly, there is no 
category of persons who are 
automatically considered persons 
in authority solely by virtue of 
their status.  The   question as to 
who should be considered as a 
person in authority is determined 
according  to the viewpoint of the 
accused.  To be considered a 
person in authority, the accused 
must believe that the recipient of 
“[T]he derived confessions 
rule serves to exclude 
statements which, despite 
not appearing to be 
involuntary when considered 
alone, are sufficiently 
connected to an earlier 
involuntary confession as to 
be rendered involuntary and 
hence inadmissible.”  
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the statement can control or influence the 
proceedings against him or her, and that belief 
must be reasonable.  Because the evidence 
necessary to establish whether or not an 
individual is a person in authority lies primarily 
with the accused, the person in authority 
requirement places an evidential burden on the 
accused.  While the Crown bears the burden of 
proving  the voluntariness of a confession beyond 
a reasonable doubt,  the accused must provide 
an evidential basis for claiming  that the receiver 
of a statement is a person in authority.
 
... Thus, where the receiver of the statement is an 
obvious state actor, such as a police officer, the 
fact that the person’s status was known to the 
accused at the time the statement was made will 
suffice to meet the evidentiary burden.  
Whenever the evidence makes clear that a voir 
dire into admissibility is required, the trial judge 
must conduct one even if none is requested 
unless, of course, the defence waives the 
requirement and consents to the statement’s 
admission. When the receiver of the statement is 
not a typical or obvious person in authority, it 
usually falls on the accused, in keeping with the 
evidential burden, to raise the issue and request 
a voir dire. [references omitted, paras. 20-23]
 
Here, the victim’s mother was not a person in 
authority; she was simply an ordinary witness in the 
proceedings. The accused did not testify that he 
believed the victim’s mother could influence or 
control the proceedings nor was there any evidence 
that the victim’s mother had any control over the 
prosecution or that she was operating  on behalf of 
the investigating  authorities. Since the accused’s 
mother was not a person in authority there was no 
need to hold a voir dire. The trial judge did not err.
Derived Confessions Rule
The derived confessions rule, which emanates from 
the common law confessions rule, was described by 
the majority as follows:
In brief, the derived confessions rule serves to 
exclude statements which, despite not appearing 
to be involuntary when considered alone, are 
sufficiently connected to an earlier involuntary 
confession as to be rendered involuntary and 
hence inadmissible. [para. 28]
And further:
[S]tatements made to a person in authority that 
are sufficiently connected to a previous 
involuntary confession to be deemed also 
involuntary. [para. 30]
There is, however, no general rule excluding  a 
subsequent statement regardless of the degree of 
connection to the initial inadmissible statement. In 
determining  whether a subsequent statement is 
sufficiently connected to a prior, inadmissible 
confession, a contextual and fact-based approach is 
used. This includes looking  at a number of factors 
such as:
• the time span between the statements, 
• advertence to the previous statement during 
questioning; 
• the discovery of additional incriminating 
evidence subsequent to the first statement; 
• the presence of the same police officers at both 
interrogations; and
• o t h e r s i m i l a r i t i e s b e t w e e n t h e t w o 
circumstances.
 
But the majority refused to decide whether the 
derived confessions rule extended to admissions 
made to ordinary persons. In this case, the accused 
did not raise the derived confessions rule at trial, nor 
bring  a Charter application seeking  the exclusion of 
the e-mail.  Instead, his lawyer consented to the 
admission of the email. In any event, it was difficult 
to find evidence of a connection between the two 
statements which would have alerted the need to 
conduct a voir dire:
• the time span between the initial apology and 
the e-mail was over five weeks;
• the inducement held out by the police was the 
suggestion that the accused may not be charged 
if he apologized. By the time the e-mail was 
sent he had been charged;
• there was no advertence to the previous 
inadmissible statement in the e-mail to the 
victim’s mother;
• the two statements were made to different 
persons in entirely different circumstances.   The 
first statement was made to a police officer in 
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the context of a custodial interrogation, while 
the second was made to the victim’s mother in 
an e-mail relating to permission to allow travel;
• the accused’s later testimony at trial revealed 
that the apology in the e-mail concerned a 
completely unrelated incident.  
The majority found the Court of Appeal erred in 
overturning  the conviction. The appeal was allowed, 
the order for a new trial set aside, the conviction was 
reinstated, and the matter was sent back to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal to consider the 
accused’s remaining grounds of appeal.
 
A View of Two
Justices Fish and Binnie had a different opinion. In 
their view the trial judge was legally bound to 
determine the admissibility of the accused’s second 
“apology”, as it was clear that it might be  a “derived 
confession”and inadmissible because of its close 
connection to the earlier excluded statement. In 
their dissent, they described the derived confessions 
rule this way:
 
The confessions rule serves to exclude 
involuntary statements made to persons in 
authority.  The derived confessions rule is a 
corollary of the confessions rule.  It excludes 
statements that are so closely connected to 
inadmissible confessions as to be “tainted” by 
association and, for that reason, inadmissible as 
well.  
 
The derived confessions rule thus excludes 
statements that, while not inadmissible when 
considered in isolation, are excluded because of 
their temporal or causal connection to another 
s t a t emen t f ound by t he cou r t t o be 
inadmissible.  This  occurs whenever “either the 
tainting features which disqualified the first 
confession continued to be present or ... the fact 
that the first statement was made was a 
substantial factor contributing to the making of 
the second statement”. 
The question is a contextual one, aimed at 
determining  the degree of connection between 
the two statements.  ...
In short, derived confessions are inadmissible 
not because they are themselves involuntary 
statements made or given to a person in 
authority, ... but because they are “tainted”, or 
contaminated, by another inadmissible 
statement. [references omitted, paras. 63-66] 
In the minority’s view, the connection between the 
two statements was apparent and a voir dire to 
determine whether the second statement was 
contaminated by the first was required. As for 
whether the derived confession need be made to a 
person in authority for it to be subject to exclusion, a 
matter the majority found unnecessary to answer, 
Justice Fish stated:
 
As a matter of principle and logic, it seems clear 
to me that derived confessions need not be 
made to a person in authority in order to be 
found inadmissible.  The purpose of the rule — 
to exclude statements with a sufficient 
connection to a prior inadmissible statement — 
would be frustrated if such a requirement were 
strictly enforced. Whether or not the subsequent 
statement was made to an authority figure, if it is 
prompted by the same police conduct that 
resulted in the earlier confession, or if it 
discloses the contents of the earlier statement 
made to authorities, it is a product of the 
inadmissible confession and is itself inadmissible 
on that ground alone.  Of course, whether the 
statement is made to police will be a relevant 
factor in determining  whether the required 
connection between the two statements has 
been made out. [para. 85]
 
The minority would have dismissed the Crown’s 
appeal and upheld the order of a new trial.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
•
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INTERNET LURING APPLIES 
EVEN THOUGH COP 
POSED AS CHILD 
R. v. Levigne, 2010 SCC 25
  
The accused, a 46 year old man, 
engaged in a series of sexually 
explicit Internet chats with an 
undercover officer who repeatedly 
and clearly represented himself as 
“Jessy G”, a 13-year-old student in grade 7. 
Throughout the online chat sessions, the accused 
reiterated his wish to perform oral sex on “Jessy G”.  
After arranging  to meet “Jessy G” and attending  at a 
local restaurant for a sexual encounter, the accused 
was arrested and charged with offences under s.
172.1 of the Criminal Code; communicating  by 
computer with an underage person, or person whom 
he believed to be underage, for the purpose of 
facilitating  the commission of an offence mentioned 
in the legislation. 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench  the 
accused said he took no steps to ascertain the real 
age of “Jessy G”. But he testified that he did not 
believe “Jessy G” was 13 because his online profile 
indicated that he was 18  and that there were 
moderators in the public chat rooms who would 
remove children (even though his communications 
with “Jessy G” occurred in a private chat room). 
The trial judge found that s.172.1(4) had no 
application because the accused’s belief was not put 
forward as a defence, but instead was an essential 
element of the offence. Under s.172.1(3) of the 
Criminal Code, where there is evidence that the 
person with whom the accused communicated was 
represented to the accused as being  underage it is, 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof that 
the accused believed that the person was underage. 
Thus, it was presumed the accused believed that he 
was communicating  with an underage sexual target. 
But the trial judge acquitted the accused, finding  his 
testimony (evidence to the contrary) left a doubt as 
to whether the accused actually believed that his 
sexual target was underage. 
 
The Crown successfully appealed to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal found that the 
trial judge had misapprehended the combined effect 
of ss.172.1(3) and (4) by failing  to apply the 
“reasonable steps” requirement found in s.172.1(4).  
Instead of ordering  a new trial, the accused’s 
acquittals were set aside, convictions entered, and 
the matter was returned to the trial court for 
sentencing. 
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada requesting  the Court of Appeal decision be 
reversed and his acquittals restored, or at least a new 
trial ordered. But the Supreme Court refused to do 
so. 
Internet Luring 
 
Section 172.1 of the Criminal Code creates the 
offence of internet luring. Justice Fish, speaking  for 
all nine judges, described the  crime as follows:
Section 172.1 prohibits the use of computers to 
communicate with an underage person or a 
person whom the accused believes to be 
underage for the purpose of facilitating  the 
commission, with respect to that person, of the 
specified sexual offences.   ... s. 172.1(1) (a) and 
s. 172.1(1)(c), ... both consist of three elements: 
(1) an intentional communication by computer; 
(2) with “a person who is, or who the accused 
“[T] the anonymity of an assumed online profile acts as both a shield for the predator 
and a sword for the police. As a shield, because it permits predators to mask their true 
identities as they pursue their nefarious intentions; as a sword (or, perhaps more 
accurately, as a barbed weapon of law enforcement), because it permits investigators, 
posing as children, to cast their lines in Internet chat rooms, where lurking predators can 
be expected to take the bait.”  
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believes is” underage; (3) for the specific 
purpose of facilitating  the commission of an 
enumerated secondary offence with respect to 
that person.
Section—172.1 was adopted by Parliament to 
identify and apprehend predatory adults who, 
generally for illicit sexual purposes, troll the 
Internet to attract and entice vulnerable children 
and adolescents. 
 
In structuring  the provision as it did, Parliament 
recognized that the anonymity of an assumed 
online profile acts as both a shield for the 
predator and a sword for the police. As a shield, 
because it permits predators to mask their true 
identities as they pursue their nefarious 
intentions; as a sword (or, perhaps more 
accurately, as a barbed weapon of law 
enforcement), because it permits investigators, 
posing as children, to cast their lines in Internet 
chat rooms, where lurking predators can be 
expected to take the bait... [paras. 23-25]    
Thus, an accused can be 
convicted under s.172.1 for 
failing  to take reasonable 
steps to determine the real 
age of the sexual target even 
though the target was in fact 
an adult pretending  to be a 
child, not a child pretending 
to be an adult. And the 
o f f e n c e i s m a d e o u t wh e n a n a c c u s e d 
communicates for the purpose prohibited by the 
section with a person whom the they believe to be 
underage.  That is the conduct deemed undesirable 
and criminalized.  
The Supreme Court noted that s.172.1 had four 
defining  characteristics (two substantive and two 
procedural) to enhance its effectiveness:
 
Substantive: Closing  the cyberspace door before 
the predator gets in to prey. Section 172.1 creates an 
incipient or “inchoate” offence; a preparatory crime 
capturing  otherwise legal conduct meant to 
culminate in the commission of a completed crime. 
It criminalizes conduct that precedes the 
commission of the sexual offences to which it refers, 
and even an attempt to commit them. The offender 
need not meet or intend to meet the victim with a 
view to committing  any of the specified secondary 
offences.
Substantive: Section 172.1 makes it an offence to 
communicate by computer for a prohibited purpose 
with a person who is underage, or who the accused 
believes is underage.  Were it otherwise, “sting” 
operations of the kind that occurred here could not 
be mounted.
Procedural: Under s.172.1(3), evidence that the 
target of the communication was represented to the 
accused to be under the specified age “is, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, proof that the 
accused believed that the person was under that 
age”.  This rebuttable presumption facilitates the 
prosecution of child luring  offences while leaving 
intact the burden on the Crown to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Put differently, s. 
172.1(3) assists the Crown in discharging  its 
evidential burden on the element of culpable belief, 
but preserves for accused persons the benefit of any 
reasonable doubt where the record discloses 
“evidence to the contrary”.
Procedural: Under s.172.1(4),  the accused’s belief 
that the person with whom he or she communicated 
was not underage will not afford a defence to the 
charge “unless the accused took reasonable steps to 
ascertain the age of the person”.  This provision 
forecloses exculpatory claims of ignorance or 
mistake that are entirely devoid of an objective 
evidentiary basis.
 
Considering  the purpose of s.172.1, Justice Fish 
found the combined effect of ss. (3) and (4) should 
be understood and applied in the following way:
1. Where it has been 
represented to the 
accused tha t the 
person with whom 
they are communicating  by computer (the 
“interlocutor”) is underage,  the accused is 
presumed to have believed that  the interlocutor 
was in fact underage;
“interlocutor” -      
someone who takes part in 
a conversation.
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2. This presumption is rebuttable. It will be 
displaced by evidence to the contrary, which 
must include evidence that the accused took 
steps to ascertain the real age of the interlocutor. 
Objectively considered, the steps taken must be 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
3. The prosecution will fail where the accused took 
reasonable steps to ascertain the age of their 
interlocutor and believed that the interlocutor 
was not underage.  In this regard, the evidential 
burden is on the accused but the persuasive 
burden is on the Crown.
4. Such evidence will at once constitute “evidence 
to the contrary” under s. 172.1(3) and satisfy the 
“reasonable steps” requirement of s. 172.1(4).  
5. Where the evidential burden of the accused has 
been discharged, they must be acquitted if the 
trier of fact is left with a reasonable doubt 
whether the accused in fact believed that their 
interlocutor was not underage.
 
The trial judge had erred in holding  that s.172.1(4) 
had no application. The “reasonable steps” 
requirement imposed foreclosed successful claims of 
mistaken belief, absent an objective evidentiary 
basis. “Parliament has deliberately proscribed in that 
section communications for the prohibited purpose 
with a person who is or who the accused believes is 
underage and cannot have intended to impose a 
‘reasonable step’ requirement on one but not the 
other,” said Justice Fish. “In either instance, the 
accused’s belief that the person was not underage 
will afford a defence — but only if the accused took 
reasonable steps to ascertain the age of his or her 
interlocutor, as required by s. 172.1(4).” 
 
In this case “Jessy G” was plainly and repeatedly 
represented as only 13 and no reasonable steps to 
ascertain that he was in fact 18 were taken. His 
belief that “Jessy G” was 18 was not reasonable in 
the circumstances nor available as a defence 
because the steps he took were neither “reasonable” 
nor “steps to ascertain the age” of the person with 
whom he was communicating  by computer for his 
sexual gratification.  The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Editor’s Note: At the time of trial, the Internet 
luring  provision was s.172.1(1)(c). Today, it has since 
been renumbered as s.172.1(1)(b). As well, the 
threshold age has been raised from 14 years to 16.  
BY THE BOOK:
s.172.1 Criminal Code: Luring a Child 
(1)  Every person commits an offence who, by 
means of a computer system within the 
m e a n i n g  o f s u b s e c t i o n 3 4 2 . 1 ( 2 ) , 
communicates with
(a) a person who is, or who the accused  believes is, under 
the age of eighteen years, for the purpose of facilitating 
the commission of an offence under subsection 153(1) 
[sexual exploitation], section 155 [incest] or 163.1 
[child pornography], subsection 212(1)  [procuring] or 
(4)  [prostitution] or section 271 [sexual assault], 272 
[sexual assault with weapon or cause bodily harm] or 
273 [aggravated sexual assault] with respect to that 
person;
(b) a person who is,  or who the accused believes is, under 
the age of  16  years, for the purpose of facilitating  the 
commission of an offence under section 151 [sexual 
interference] or 152 [invitation to sexual touching], 
subsection 160(3)  [bestiality] or 173(2)  [exposure] or 
section 280 [abduction] with respect to that person; or
(c) a person who is,  or who the accused believes is, under 
the age of  14 years, for the purpose of facilitating  the 
commission of an offence under section 281 
[abduction] with respect to that person. 
s.342.1(2) “computer system” means a device that, or 
a group of  interconnected or related devices one or more 
of which,
(a)  contains computer programs or other data, and          
(b)  pursuant to computer programs,        
 (i) performs logic and control, and 
 (ii) may perform any other function.
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police officers. 
50 one-minute tips for better communications: 
speak, write and present more effectively.
Phillip E. Bozek.
[Rochester, NY] : Axzo Press, 2009
HF 5718 B69 2009
The art and science of security risk assessment.
Ira S. Somerson.
[Alexandria, Va.] : ASIS International, c2009.
HV 8290 S663 2009
The business of listening: become a more 
effective listener.
Diana Bonet Romero.
[Rochester, NY] : Axzo Press, 2009.
HD 30.3 B654 2009
Communica t ion in c r i s i s and hos tage 
negotiations : practical communication 
techniques, stratagems, and strategies for law 
enforcement, corrections and emergency service 
personnel in managing critical incidents.
by Arthur A. Slatkin.
Springfield, Ill. : Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 
c2010.
HV 6595 S53 2010
Data mining for intelligence, fraud, & criminal 
detection : advanced analytics & information 
sharing technologies.
Christopher Westphal.
Boca Raton : CRC Press, c2009.
HV 8079 C65 W47 2009
Executive protection : rising to the challenge.
by Robert L. Oatman.
Alexandria, Va. : ASIS International, c2009.
HV 8290 O284 2009
The explanation of crime : context, mechanisms 
and development.
edited by Per-Olof H. Wikstrom, Robert J. Sampson.
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2009.
HV 6080 E975 2009
Forensic factor. Sniper [videorecording].
[Scarborough, Ont.] : Distribution Access 
[distributor], 2007.
1 videodisc (DVD) (60 min.) : sd., col. ; 4 3/4 in.
For 23 days in October, 2002, a sniper terrorizes the 
Washington DC area, shooting  thirteen people and 
killing  ten. The victims are ordinary people doing 
routine activities. Nothing  links them; they are 
chosen at random. Police mount one of the largest 
investigations in American history to catch a ruthless 
and elusive killer. In the end, their most productive 
clue comes from the sniper himself, who calls a 
police tip line and brags about a previous shooting 
in Alabama. Authorities are able to recover a single 
fingerprint from that crime, which eventually leads 
them to not one, but two killers, including  a 
seventeen-year-old boy.
HV 8079 H6 F674 2007 D939
Gangs in Canada.
Jeff Pearce.
[Edmonton] : Quagmire Press, c2009.
HV 6439 C3 P42 2010
Generation blend:  managing across the 
technology age gap.
Rob Salkowitz.
Hoboken, N.J. : John Wiley & Sons, c2008.
HD 6279 S25 2008
Managing  high-risk sex offenders in the 
community : risk management, treatment and 
social responsibility.
edited by Karen Harrison.
Cullompton, UK ; Portland, Or. : Willan, 2010.
HV 6556 M36 2010
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Managing  personal change : stay positive and stay in 
control.
Cynthia D. Scott, Dennis T. Jaffe.
[Rochester, NY] : Axzo Press, 2009.
BF 471 S267 2009
Mentoring: make it a mutually rewarding 
experience.
Gordon F. Shea,Stephen C. Gianotti.
[Rochester, NY] : Axzo Press, c2009.
HF 5385 S54 2009
New directions in surveillance and privacy.
edited by Benjamin J. Goold and Daniel Neyland.
Cullompton, Devon, U.K.; Portland, Or.: Willan 
Pub., 2009.
K 3263 N49 2009
The power of appreciative inquiry :  a practical 
guide to positive change.
Diana Whitney & Amanda Trosten-Bloom ; foreword 
by David Cooperrider.
San Francisco : Berrett-Koehler Publishers, c2010.
HD 30.3 W52 2010
Presentation skills :  captivate and educate your 
audience.
Steve Mandel.
[Rochester, NY] : Axzo Press, 2009.
PN 4121 M319 2009
Standing  in the fire :  leading  high-heat meetings 
with calm, clarity, and courage.
Larry Dressler.
San Francisco : Berrett-Koehler Publishers: 
[Distributed by] Ingram Publisher Services, c2010.
HF 5734.5 D74 2010
Supervising  police personnel  :  the fifteen 
responsibilities.
Paul M.  Whisenand.
Upper Saddle River, N.J. : Pearson Prentice Hall, 
[2010], c2011.
HV 7936 S8 W48 2010
Use of force report writing: part 1:  legal 
considerations. [videorecording]
Burlington, NC : ALERT Publishing Inc., c2001.
1 videodisc (DVD) (14 min.) : sd., col. ; 4 3/4 in.
This program presents experts who offer their tips on 
proper writing  skills, with a particular emphasis on 
report writing  for use-of-force incidents. It stresses 
the most common mistakes made in incident report 
writing.
HV 7936 R53 R468 2001 D1009
British Columbia 
Police and Peace Officers 
Memorial Service
Sunday
September 26, 2010
Ceremony 1:00 pm,
the Bastion
on the grounds of the
Parliament Buildings 
Victoria, 
British Columbia
www.10-8.ca
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s.24(1) REMEDY CAN INCLUDE 
DAMAGE$ FOR CHARTER 
BREACHES
Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27
 
Police received information that an 
unknown individual (described as a 
white male, 30 to 35 years, 5' 9", with 
dark short hair, wearing  a white golf 
shirt or T‑shirt with some red on it) 
intended to throw a pie at Prime Minister Chrétien 
while participating  in a ceremony in Vancouver’s 
Chinatown. The plaintiff, a Vancouver lawyer, was 
mistakenly identified as the would be pie-thrower. 
He was a white male, had grey, collar‑length hair, 
was in his mid‑40s, was wearing  a grey T‑shirt with 
some red on it, and was running, appearing  to be 
avoiding  interception. The officers chased him down 
and handcuffed him. The plaintiff loudly protested 
his detention, created a disturbance, and was 
arrested for breach of the peace. He was taken to the 
police lockup and effectively strip searched. His car 
was impounded for the purpose of searching  it once 
a search warrant had been obtained. But detectives 
subsequently determined that they did not have 
grounds to obtain a search warrant nor evidence to 
charge the plaintiff with attempted assault. After 
being  held for about four and a half hours he was 
released, several hours after the ceremony and the 
Prime Minister had left Chinatown.
 
The plaintiff  brought an action in tort and for breach 
of his Charter rights arising  from his arrest, 
detention, strip search, and car seizure. The trial 
judge found the plaintiff’s arrest for breach of the 
peace was lawful, but held the strip search 
undertaken by the province’s correctional officers as 
well as the vehicle seizure by the police violated his 
right to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure under s. 8 of the Charter. Plus, the plaintiff’s 
rights under s.9 were breached when he was held in 
the police lockup longer than necessary. The judge 
assessed damages under s.24(1) of the Charter  at 
$100 for the seizure of the car, $5,000 for the strip 
search, and $5,000 for wrongful imprisonment. He 
rejected the governments’ argument that damages 
were an inappropriate remedy for Charter breaches 
absent bad faith, abuse of power, or tortious 
conduct. 
The province and the city unsuccessfully appealed 
to the British Columbia Court of Appeal. The 
majority agreed that bad faith, abuse of power, or 
tortious conduct were not necessary requirements 
for the awarding  of Charter damages. A dissenting 
justice, would have allowed the defendants’ appeals, 
finding  that damages could not be awarded where 
the police did not act in bad faith and simply made 
a mistake as to the proper course of action. 
The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Canada. 
Damages Under s.24(1) Charter
 
Section 24(1) of the Charter allows courts to grant 
“appropriate and just” remedies for Charter 
breaches.   This can include damages for breaching  a 
claimant’s Charter rights ruled the Supreme Court of 
Canada. But Charter damages are not private law 
damages; they are a dis t inct remedy for 
constitutional damages. “The nature of the remedy is 
to require the state (or society writ large) to 
compensate an individual for breaches of the 
individual’s constitutional rights,” said Chief Justice 
MacLachlin, speaking  for the unanimous Supreme 
Court.  “An action for public law damages — 
including  constitutional damages — lies against the 
state and not against individual actors. Actions 
against individual actors should be pursued in 
accordance with existing  causes of action.” She then 
went on to outline a four step process in assessing 
when damages under s.24(1) are available:
Step One:  Proof of a Charter Breach  - the first step 
is to establish a Charter breach on which the claim 
for damages is based.
 
Step Two: Functional Justification of Damages - 
the claimant must demonstrate that damages are 
appropriate and just to the extent that they serve a 
useful function or purpose. Damages must further 
the general objects of the Charter:
• the function of compensation  - compensating 
the claimant for loss and suffering  caused by the 
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breach. A breach of an individual’s Charter 
rights may cause personal loss which should be 
remedied and compensated. Personal loss 
includes physical, psychological, pecuniary, or 
harm to intangible interests 
such as distress, humiliation, 
embarrassment, or anxiety 
caused by the Charter breach; 
• the function of vindication  - vindicating  the 
right by emphasizing  its importance and the 
gravity of the breach. Charter rights must be 
maintained and cannot be allowed to be 
whittled away by attrition. Vindication focuses 
on the harm the infringement causes the state 
and society as a whole, such as impairing  public 
confidence or diminishing  public faith in 
constitutional protections;
• the function of deterrence -  deterring  state 
actors from committing  future breaches. 
Deterrence has a societal purpose and seeks to 
regulate government behaviour, generally, in 
order to achieve compliance with the 
Constitution. Like “general deterrence” in 
criminal sentencing, which sends a message to 
others who may be inclined to engage in similar 
criminal activity, deterrence as an object of 
Charter damages is not aimed at deterring  the 
specific wrongdoer, but rather at influencing 
government behaviour in order to secure state 
compliance with the Charter in the future.
 
Step Three:  Countervailing  Factors - even if the 
claimant establishes that damages are functionally 
justified, the state has the opportunity to 
demonstrate, if it can, that countervailing  factors 
defeat the functional considerations supporting  a 
damage award and render damages inappropriate or 
unjust.  Although a complete catalogue of 
countervailing  considerations will develop in the 
jurisprudence, two considerations include the 
existence of alternative remedies and concerns for 
good governance. 
• Alternative Remedies: If other remedies 
adequately meet the need for compensation, 
vindication and/or deterrence, a further award 
of damages under s.24(1), which operates 
concurrently with and does not replace other 
areas of law, would serve no function and 
would not be “appropriate and just”.  
Alternative remedies include private law 
remedies for personal injury actions, other 
Charter remedies like declarations under s.
24(1), and remedies under legislation permitting 
proceedings against the Crown.  Once the 
claimant establishes basic functionality the 
evidentiary burden then shifts to the state to 
show that the functions engaged can be fulfilled 
through other remedies. The claimant need not 
show that she has exhausted all other 
recourses. Rather, it is for the state to show that 
other remedies are available in the particular 
case that will sufficiently address the breach.  
But the existence of a potential claim in tort 
does not bar a claimant from obtaining  damages 
under the Charter.   Tort law and the Charter are 
distinct legal avenues. However, a concurrent 
action in tort, or other private law claim, bars s.
24(1) damages if the result would be double 
compensation. As well, declarations of a Charter 
breach may provide an adequate remedy, 
particularly where the claimant has suffered no 
personal damage.
• Good Governance: The concern for effective 
governance may negate the appropriateness of 
s.24(1) damages.  Good governance concerns 
may take different forms.  At one extreme, it  
may be argued that any award of s.24(1) 
damages will always have a chilling  effect on 
government conduct, and hence will impact 
negatively on good governance.  On the other 
hand, the state may establish that an award of 
Charter damages would interfere with good 
governance such that damages should not be 
awarded unless the state conduct meets a 
minimum threshold of gravity.  For example, 
state action taken under a statute which is 
subsequently declared invalid will not give rise 
to public law damages because good 
governance requires that public officials carry 
out their duties under valid statutes without fear 
of liability in the event that the statute is later 
struck down. Duly enacted laws should be 
enforced until declared invalid, unless the state 
“pecuniary” -  
of or relating 
to money.
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conduct is clearly wrong, in bad faith, or an 
abuse of power. 
Step Four:  Quantum of s.24(1) Damages - the 
amount, or quantum, of damages must be 
“appropriate and just”. The objects of compensation, 
vindication, and deterrence will determine the 
amount of damages awarded. Where the objective of 
compensation is engaged, the concern is to restore 
the claimant to the position they would have been in 
had the breach not been committed. Any claim for 
compensatory damages must be supported by 
evidence of the loss suffered. This may include 
pecuniary loss - injuries (physical and psychological) 
may require medical treatment, with attendant costs 
while prolonged detention may result in loss of 
earnings.   
Non-pecuniary damages, such as pain and suffering, 
are harder to measure but tort law can provide 
assistance. Where the objectives of vindication and 
deterrence are engaged, the seriousness of the 
breach must be evaluated with regard to the impact 
of the breach on the claimant and the seriousness of 
the state misconduct. The more egregious the 
conduct and the more serious the repercussions on 
the claimant, the higher the award for vindication or 
deterrence will be. But the damages must not only 
be appropriate and just to the 
claimant, they must also be 
appropriate and just to the 
state. Large awards and the 
consequent diversion of 
public funds may serve little 
functional purpose in terms 
of the claimant’s needs and 
may be inappropriate or 
unjust from the public perspective.  In 
considering  what is fair  to the claimant and the state, 
the court may take into account the public interest in 
good governance, the danger of deterring 
governments from undertaking  beneficial new 
policies and programs, and the need to avoid 
diverting  large sums of funds from public programs 
to private interests. To be “appropriate and just”, an 
award of damages must represent a meaningful 
response to the seriousness of the breach and the 
objectives of compensation, upholding  Charter 
values, and deterring  future breaches. In assessing  s.
24(1) damages, the court must focus on the breach 
of Charter rights as an independent wrong, worthy of 
compensation in its own right.  At the same time, 
damages under s.24(1) should not duplicate 
damages awarded under private law causes of 
action, such as tort, where compensation of personal 
loss is at issue.
Strip Search Damages
 
In this case the trial judge found that the strip search 
violated the plaintiff’s personal rights under s.8  of the 
Charter (step 1). And his injury was serious (step  2).  
“He had a constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure, which was 
violated in an egregious fashion,” said the Supreme 
Court. “Strip searches are inherently humiliating  and 
degrading  regardless of the manner in which they 
are carried out and thus constitute significant injury 
to an individual’s intangible interests.” The plaintiff 
did not commit a serious offence, he was not 
charged with an offence associated with evidence 
being  hidden on the body, no weapons were 
involved and he was not known to be violent or to 
carry weapons. Nor did he pose a risk of harm to 
himself or others. Plus the officers should have been 
familiar with settled law regarding  routine strip 
searches and their inappropriateness. The Charter 
breach significantly impacted the plaintiff’s person 
and rights, and the police conduct was serious. The 
objects of compensation, vindication, and 
deterrence of future breaches were all engaged.  The 
state, however, did not establish any countervailing 
factors (step 3). Alternative remedies were not 
available to achieve the objects of compensation, 
vindication, or deterrence with respect to the strip 
search.  The plaintiff’s claims for assault and 
negligence had been dismissed and no tort action 
was available for a breach of his s.8  right. And a 
declaration under s.24(1) would not satisfy the need 
for compensation.  Furthermore, the state did not 
establish that an award under s.24(1) for damages 
was negated by good governance considerations. As 
for quantum of damages (step  4), although strip 
searches are inherently humiliating  and a significant 
injury to an individual’s intangible interests 
regardless of the manner in which they are carried 
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Registration Form 
Abbotsford Police Challenge 
Saturday, September 18, 2010 
 
 
 
Distance:             5K  10K 
 
Gender          M  F 
 
Do you wish to be timed for this event? ________ 
 
Age (on racing day): _________________________ 
Birthday (y/m/d): ___________________________ 
Last Name:  ________________________________ 
First name: ________________________________ 
Full Address: ______________________________ 
__________________________________________ 
Telephone: ________________________________ 
Organization/School/Class: ___________________ 
Name of Group Coordinator for Package Pickup: 
__________________________________________ 
 
Adult T-shirt sizes only: 
____SM  ____ Med ___Lrg 
____XL  ____ No shirt 
                
Amount Paid: ___________ (no refunds) 
Make cheque payable to “Abbotsford Police Challenge” or 
exact cash only – no change available 
***There will be an additional $25 charge for lost or 
replacement chips*** 
***Incomplete registrations are not eligible for awards*** 
Athlete’s waiver:  In consideration of your accepting this entry, I 
hereby for myself, my heirs, executors and administrators, waive 
and release any and all rights or claims for damages I may have 
against the organizers or the agents, successors, representatives 
and assigns and the race sponsors for all and any injury, damage 
or loss  I may sustain during the entire event. 
Parental signature (must be signed if athlete is under 19 years 
of age): I, the legal parent/guardian of the above competitor 
hereby certify that I have read and agree to be bound by the terms 
of the above waiver on behalf of the said competitor. 
 
_________________________________ Date: ______________ 
Signature of Athlete or parent/guardian if under 19 
The Police Challenge Run 
Supports three Charities that 
are very important to the 
Police Community. 
 
BC Special Olympics 
ALS Society of BC 
United Way 
 
BC Special Olympics: www.bcso.bc.ca 
ALS Society:  www.alsbc.ca 
The United Way: www.uwfv.bc.ca  
 
 
The Police Challenge started back 
in 1990 as a fundraising event for 
the Law Enforcement Torch Run 
for Special Olympics. 
 
Over the years the run has 
expanded from a local fundraising 
event for the former Matsqui 
Police to incorporate other 
charities that the Police 
Department has supported.  
 
The run is now one of the leading 
community fundraisers for the BC 
Special Olympics, ALS Society and 
The United Way 
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Bib No:  
Runners must run in race selected. Failure to do so may 
eliminate you from any prizes in a category. 
out, the strip search in this case was relatively brief 
and not extremely disrespectful. It did not involve 
the removal of the plaintiff’s underwear nor the 
exposure of his genitals. He was never touched 
during  the search and there was no indication that 
he suffered any resulting  physical or psychological 
injury. A moderate damages award was proper. The 
trial judge’s award of $5,000 was appropriate.
Car Seizure Damages
 
The trial judge ruled the vehicle seizure breached s.
8  (step 1). However, the object of compensation 
(step 2) was not engaged by the seizure of the car 
because the plaintiff did not suffer any injury as a 
result of it. His car was never searched and he was 
subsequently driven to the police compound to pick 
it up.  Nor were the objects of vindication and 
deterrence compelling.  While the vehicle seizure 
was wrong, it was not of a serious nature. The police 
officers did not illegally search the car, but arranged 
for its towing  under the impression that it would be 
searched once a warrant had been obtained. When 
the officers determined that they did not have 
grounds to obtain the required warrant, the vehicle 
was made available for release. Thus, the Supreme
Court concluded damages for the vehicle seizure 
were not justified and a declaration under s.24(1) 
that the vehicle seizure violat d s.8 adequately 
served the need for vindication and deterrence of 
future improper car seizures. The award of $100 was 
set aside, and a declaration under s.24(1) that the 
seizure of the vehicle violated s.8 was substituted.  
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
 
 
2010 Abbotsford Police Challenge Run
Saturday September 18, 2010
The Abbotsford Police Challenge Run started in 
1990 to raise funds for BC Special Olympics. 
Since its inception, the number of participants and 
sponsors has increased to the point where the 
Abbotsford Police Challenge has become a 
premier event of its kind in the Fraser Valley. The 
Abbotsford Police Challenge is committed to 
being  a family oriented event and for those who 
don’t run there is a 5 kilometer fun run/walk route 
so no one is excluded from participating. It is now 
one of the leading  community fundraisers for the 
BC Special Olympics, ALS Society, and the United 
Way.   
 
EVENTS
10K Challenge and 5K Fun Run 
Walkers, runners, wheelchairs and strollers 
welcome! 
LOCATION 
Civic Plaza, next to the Abbotsford Police 
Department 2838 Justice Way, Abbotsford, BC  
  
RACE TIME 
Both events start at 9:00 am 
Warm-up led by Apollo Athletic Club at 8:30am 
 
INFORMATION 
Abbotsford Police Department 
Phone: 604-859-5225 or 1-800-898-6111; ask for 
the Challenge Run or visit the website at:  
www.abbypd.ca 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Alcohol: Odour v. Amount 
“The odour of alcohol on one’s 
breath is some indication of the 
consumption of alcohol, but no 
i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e a m o u n t 
consumed.” - Ontario Court of Appeal Justice Doherty 
in R. v. Ramage, 2010 ONCA 488 at para. 16.
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